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PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to Article I of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon the following provisions regarding implementation of the Treaty.

This Protocol is organized into ten Parts.

Part One, Terms and Their Definitions, contains the definitions of terms that are used in the Treaty and this Protocol.

Part Two, Categories of Data Pertaining to Strategic Offensive Arms, contains the categories of data with respect to items subject to the Treaty.

Part Three, Conversion or Elimination Procedures, contains procedures governing the conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities.

Part Four, Notifications, contains the iist of notifications provided for in Article VII of the Treaty.

Part Five, Inspection Activities, contains provisions governing the conduct of inspection activities provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

Part Six, Bilateral Consultative Commission, hereinafter referred to as the BCC, contains provisions governing the operation of the BCC, established pursuant to Article XI1 of
the Treaty.

Part Seven, Telemetric Information, contains the procedures associated with the fulfillment of obligations concerning telemetric information, pursuant to Article IX of the Treaty.

Part Eight, Provisional Application, governs provisional application of certain provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol.

Part Nine, Agreed Statements, contains Agreed Statements regarding the Treaty and this Protocol.

Part Ten, Final Provisions, contains general provisions applicable to this Protocol.

PART ONE -TERMS AND THEIR DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of the Treaty and this Protocol:

1. (1.) The term “air base” means a facility at which deployed heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported.
2. (23.) The term “aircraft” means any manned machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from interaction with the air other than the interaction of the air with the Earth’s surface.
3. (86.) The term “aircrew member” means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on the inspecting Party’s list of aircrew members.
4. (22.) The term “air-launched cruise missile” or “ALCM” means an air-to-surface cruise missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested from an aircraft or deployed on a bomber after December 31, 1986.
5. (70.) The term “airplane” means a power-driven, heavier- than-air aircraft that derives its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces that remain fixed under given conditions of flight.
6. (5.) The term “ballistic missile” means a missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. ( ) The number in parenthesis is the number in the Russian text.
7. (69.) The term “basing area” means an area within an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, in which deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs are based and in which fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs are located.
8. (9.) The term “bomber” means an airplane of a type, any one of which was initially constructed or later converted to be equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles.
9. (32.) The term “conversion or elimination facility” means:
(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility for the elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, and launch canisters;
(b) For mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility for the conversion or elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(c) For SLBM launchers, a specified facility for the conversion or elimination of SLBM launchers;
(d) For heavy bombers, a specified facility for the conversion of heavy bombers, or the elimination of heavy bombers.
10. (21.) The term ‘cruise missile” means a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled weapon-delivery vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path.
11. (14.) The term “declared data” means, for the data the accuracy of which is confirmed during inspection activities:
(a) Data with respect to items subject to the Treaty, specified according to categories of data contained in Part Two of this Protocol;
(b) Data included in notifications provided in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol that update the data according to categories of data contained in Part Two of this Protocol;
(c) Information on technical characteristics of new types of strategic offensive arms included in notifications provided in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol that update the data according to categories of data contained in Part Two of this Protocol, and that have been confirmed during exhibitions; and
(d) Information that the inspected Party provides to inspection teams during pre-inspection procedures.
12. (67.) The term “deployed heavy bomber” means a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, other than a test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber located at a repair facility or at a production facility.
13. (63.) The term “deployed ICBM” means an ICBM that is contained in or on a deployed launcher of ICBMs.
14. (66.) The term “deployed launcher of ICBMs” means an ICBM launcher that contains an ICBM and is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, or an ICBM launcher located at a space launch facility.
15. (65.) The term “deployed launcher of SLBMs” means an SLBM launcher installed on a submarine that has been launched, that contains an SLBM, and is not intended for testing or training.
16. (64.) The term “deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs” means a mobile launcher of ICBMs that contains an ICBM and is not a mobile test launcher or a mobile launcher of ICBMs located at a space launch facility.
17. (62.) The term “deployed SLBM” means an SLBM that is contained in a deployed launcher of SLBMs.
18. (46.) The term “distinguishable” means different on the basis of the totality of external and functional differences that are observable by national technical means of verification, or, when such observations may be inconclusive in the opinion of the inspecting Party, that are visible during inspection activities.
19. (11.) The term “each year” means during a period of 12 months commencing on the date of entry into force of the Treaty or on an anniversary of that date.
20. (43.) The term “facility” means an ICBM base, submarine base, air base, maintenance facility, basing area, silo launcher group, ICBM loading facility, SLBM loading facility,
production facility, repair facility, storage facility, training facility, conversion or elimination facility, test range, heavy bomber flight test center, or space launch facility.
21. (74.) The term “fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs” means a unique structure, within a basing area, designed to contain mobile launchers of ICBMs.
22. (12.) The term “front section” means that portion of the payload of the final stage that contains the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and may, depending on design, include a platform for a reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles, penetration aids, and a shroud.
23. (80.) The term “heavy bomber” means a bomber of a type, any one of which satisfies either of the following criteria:
(a) Its range is greater than 8000 kilometers; or
(b) It is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. A bomber shall not be considered to be a heavy bomber if it meets neither criterion (a) nor criterion (b) or if otherwise agreed by the Parties.
24. (81.) The term “heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments” means a heavy bomber that is not equipped for long- range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs.
25. (82.) The term “heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments” means a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs.
26. (85.) The term “heavy bomber flight test center” means a facility, other than a production facility for heavy bombers, at which test heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported.
27. (3.) The term ‘ICBM base” means:
(a) For mobile launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more basing areas and one associated maintenance facility are located;
(b) For silo launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more groups of silo launchers of ICBMs and one associated maintenance facility are located.
28. (56.) The term “ICBM launcher” means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.
29. (27.) The term “ICBM loading facility” means a facility, outside an ICBM base and outside a test range, where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from mobile launchers of ICBMs.
30. (24.) The term “in-country escort” means a group of individuals designated by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members throughout the in- country period.
31. (48.) The term “in-country period” means the period of time from the arrival of the inspection team or aircrew members at the point of entry until their departure from the country through the point of entry.
32. (17.) The term “inspection activities” means inspections and exhibitions.
33. (30.) The term “inspection activity site” means a location at which inspections or exhibitions may be conducted.
34. (29.) The term “inspection site” means a location at which Type One or Type Two inspections may be conducted.
35. (16.) The term “inspection team” means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection activity.
36. (15.) The term “inspector” means an individual specified by one of the Parties to conduct inspection activities and included on that Party’s list of inspectors.
37. (25.) The term “intercontinental ballistic missile” or “ICBM” means a land-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5500 kilometers.
38. (54.) The term “launch” means the initial motion and subsequent flight of an ICBM or SLBM.
39. (61.) The term “launch canister” means a container, directly associated with an ICBM or SLBM, that can be or has been used for transporting and storing an assembled ICBM or SLBM, with or without its front section, and from which an ICBM or SLBM can be or has been launched.
40. (60.) The term “launcher of missile defense interceptors” means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch missile defense interceptors.
41. (20.) The term “long-range ALCM” means an ALCM with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
42. (89.) The term “long-range nuclear ALCM” means a long- range ALCM that is nuclear-armed.
43. (44.) The term “maintenance facility” means a facility that is part of an ICBM base and at which ICBMs and ICBM launchers are maintained and their operation is supported.
44. (52.) The term “missile defense interceptor” means a missile that was developed, tested, and deployed in order to intercept ICBMs, SLBMs, or their reentry vehicles.
45. (35.) The term “mobile launcher of ICBMs” means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the self- propelled device on which it is mounted.
46. (42.) The term “new typeu1 means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or a type of SLBM, the technical characteristics of which differ from the technical characteristics of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each type declared previously in at least one of the following respects:
(a) Number of stages.
(b) Type of propellant of any stage.
(c) Either the length of the assembled missile without front section or the length of the first stage, by more than three percent.
(d) Diameter of the first stage, by more than three percent.
47. (41.) The term “non-deployed heavy bomber” means a test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments located at a repair facility or at a production facility.
48. (37.) The term “non-deployed ICBM” means an ICBM not contained in a deployed launcher of ICBMs or on a deployed launcher of ICBMs.
49. (40.) The term “non-deployed launcher of ICBMs” means an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, an ICBM launcher located at a space launch facility, or an ICBM launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, that does not contain a deployed ICBM.
50. (39.) The term “non-deployed launcher of SLBMs” means an SLBM launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, that is intended for testing or training, or an SLBM launcher that does not contain a deployed SLBM.
51. (38.) The term “non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs” means a mobile launcher of ICBMs that does not contain an ICBM, or a mobile test launcher of ICBMs, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs located at a space launch facility, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
52. (36.) The term “non-deployed SLBM” means an SLBM not contained in a deployed launcher of SLBMs.
53. (90.) The term “nuclear armaments” means, for heavy bombers, long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs.
54. (71.) The term “Open Skies airplane” means an airplane performing an observation flight in accordance with the Open Skies Treaty of March 24, 1992, that is simultaneously used for transporting an inspection team to or from a point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party.
55. (47.) The term “period of inspection activities” means, for an inspection or exhibition, the period of time from the completion of pre-inspection procedures until the commencement of post-inspection procedures.
56. (51.) The term “produce” means build, construct, or manufacture in any quantity, and includes serial production as well as one-of-a-kind manufacturing.
57. (45.) The term “production facility” means:
(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs, a facility at which:
(i) ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in their launch canisters, are assembled, including the joining of all stages of such missiles and the loading of such missiles into launch canisters.
(ii) ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, are assembled, including the joining of two or more stages.
(iiij First stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are assembled.
(b) For ballistic missile submarines, a facility at which construction of ballistic missile submarines is performed.
(c) For mobile launchers of ICBMs, a facility at which the erector-launcher mechanism of a mobile launcher of ICBMs is mounted on the self-propelled device.
(d) For heavy bombers, a facility at which assembly of a complete heavy bomber airframe is performed.
58. (53.) The term “prototype” means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, no more than 20 missiles of which have been launched, and no launchers of missiles of which have been deployed.
59. (13.) The term “range” means:
(a) For an ALCM, the maximum distance that can be flown by an ALCM of that type in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth’s sphere from the launch point to the point of impact.
(b) For a ballistic missile, the maximum distance determined by projecting the flight trajectory onto the Earth’s sphere from the launch point of a missile of that type to the point of impact of a reentry vehicle.
(c) For an aircraft, the maximum distance that can be flown, without refueling, by an aircraft of that type when carrying an ordnance load of 7500 kilograms, with a full fuel load in the internal and external fuel tanks and a flight profile optimized to ensure minimum fuel consumption per kilometer, taking into account the distance covered during climb and descent. The fuel remaining in the fuel tanks after landing shall be no more than five percent of the maximum capacity of the fuel tanks.
60. (7.) The term “reentry vehicle” means that part of the front section that can survive reentry through the dense layers of the Earth’s atmosphere and that is designed for delivering a weapon to a target or for testing such a delivery.
61. (33.) The term “repair facility” means:
(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or a submarine base, for the repair or maintenance of ICBMs or SLBMs.
(b) For mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, for the repair or maintenance of mobile launchers of ICBMs.
(c) For heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the repair or maintenance of heavy bombers.
62. (19.) The term “rocket motor case” means the case that remains after the solid propellant is removed from the solid rocket motor.
63. (2.) The term “self-contained dispensing mechanism” means a device that separates from the final stage of a missile together with the front section and that independently targets and releases the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and penetration aids.
64. (49.) The term “sequential inspection” means an inspection, conducted at facilities associated with the same point of entry, by an inspection team that has not departed
the territory of the inspected Party following the completion of the previous inspection.
65. (87.) The term “silo launcher of ICBMs” means an ICBM launcher in a silo structure located in the ground.
66. (88.) The term “silo training launcher” means a full- scale silo launcher of ICBMs specified for training purposes.
67. (55.) The term ‘SLBM launcher” means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an SLBM.
68. (26.) The term “SLBM loading facility” means a shore- based facility, outside a submarine base, where SLBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from ballistic missile submarines.
69. (57.) The term “soft-site launcher” means any land-based fixed launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs other than a silo launcher.
70. (77.) The term “solid-fueled ICBM” means an ICBM for which all stages are equipped with solid rocket motors.
71. (76.) The term “solid-fueled SLBM” means an SLBM for which all stages are equipped with solid rocket motors.
72. (78.) The term “solid rocket motor” means that part of the stage that consists of the case filled with solid propellant.
73. (28.) The term “space launch facility” means a specified facility from which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs.
74. (75.) The term “stage” means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a section of a missile that is equipped with a propulsion unit, with the exception of the self-contained dispensing mechanism.
75. (34.) The term “storage facility” means:
(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a submarine base, a test range, or a space launch facility, for the storage of ICBMs or SLBMs.
(b) For mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a test range, or a space launch facility, for the storage of mobile launchers of ICBMs.
(c) For heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the storage of heavy bombers.
76. (4.) The term “submarine base” means a facility at which ballistic missile submarines, as well as submarines that had been previously equipped with SLBM launchers but after conversion are incapable of launching SLBMs, are based, and at which shore-based support for such submarines, which may include the assembly, loading, maintenance, and storage of SLBMs, is provided.
77. (6.) The term “submarine-launched ballistic missile” or “SLBM” means a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers of a type, any one of which has been contained in, or launched from, a submarine.
78. (79.) The term “telemetric information” means information that originates on board a missile during its initial motion and subsequent flight that is broadcast.
79. (83.) The term “test heavy bomber” means a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments designated exclusively for testing and based at a heavy bomber flight test center.
80. (58.) The term “test launcher1′ means an ICBM launcher or an SLBM launcher located within a test range.
81. (18.) The term “test range1′ means a designated land area, other than an ICBM base, from which launches of ICBMs or SLBMs are conducted.
82. (31.) The term “training facility” means a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or a submarine base, at which personnel are trained to use, operate, or maintain ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers.
83. (59.) The term “training launcher” means a silo training launcher or a mobile training launcher.
84. (84.) The term “training model of a missile” means a full-scale, inert model of an ICBM or SLBM that is not capable of being launched and that differs from an ICBM or SLBM on the basis of external and functional differences that are visible
during inspection activities.
85. (50.) The term “transit” means the one-way movement from one facility to another facility of:
(a) A non-deployed ICBM;
(b) A non-deployed SLBM; or
(c) A non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs.
86. (72.) The term “unique identifier” or “UID” means a non- repeating alpha-numeric number that has been applied by the inspected Party to an ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber.
87. (10.) The term “variant” means:
(a) For heavy bombers, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of airplanes of one type and one category that are distinguishable from other airplanes of the same type and the same category.
(b) For ICBMs and SLBMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of ICBMs of one type or SLBMs of one type that are distinguishable from other ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type.
88. (68.) The term “version” means, for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a type, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, based on external or functional differences from other such items.
89. (8.) The term “warhead” means a unit of account used for counting toward the 1550 aggregate limit as applied to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.
90. (73.) The term “weapon-delivery vehicle” means, for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile of a type, any one of which has been launched or flight-tested, or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or any device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it.

PART TWO -CATEGORIES OF DATA PERTAINING TO STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Section I. General Provisions

1. The Parties shall use the categories of data contained in this Part when providing data in accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol.
2. No later than 45 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide, in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol, site diagrams of facilities and, if applicable, coastlines and waters diagrams for each facility at which inspection activities may be conducted.
3. No later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall carry out an initial exchange of data according to the categories of data contained in this Part, and shall provide, in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol, photographs, unless such photographs were previously provided in connection with fulfilling the requirements of the START Treaty.
4. For the purposes of this Part and exchanges of data, the mark “—” denotes that the entry is not applicable in such case. The mark “* * *” denotes that this data will be provided when available.
5. Each ICBM, each SLBM, and each heavy bomber shall have a unique identifier.
6. For the purposes of this Part, geographic coordinates shall be expressed in latitude and longitude to the nearest minute, except in cases where two or more locations for which
geographic coordinates are specified that are within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other and that are of the same type or have the same appearance. In such cases, the latitude and longitude shall be expressed to include seconds.
7. In specifying geographic coordinates, each Party shall use the system of coordinates commonly employed by it.
8. Geographic coordinates for silo launchers of ICBMs located in a silo launcher group at an ICBM base and test launchers shall be expressed to the nearest minute.
Section 11. Aggregate Numbers

For each Party, the data on aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms limited by the Treaty are as follows:

United States of America Russian Federation

Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers *t*

***Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers *** Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers ***

Section 111. ICBMs, ICBM Launchers, and Warheads on Deployed ICBMs

For each Party, the numbers of deployed ICBMs, non-deployed ICBMs, deployed launchers of ICBMs, non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, warheads on deployed ICBMs, as well as data on facilities associated with ICBMs, are as follows:

Section IV. SLBMs, SLBM Launchers, and Warheads on Deployed SLBMs

For each Party, the numbers of deployed SLBMS, non-deployed SLBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, as well as data on facilities associated with SLBMs, are as follows:

Section V. Heavy Bombers and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers

For each Party, the numbers of deployed heavy bombers, non-deployed heavy bombers, nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers, as well as data on facilities associated with heavy bombers, are as follows:

For each Party, the numbers of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, at space launch facilities, and the data on space launch facilities, are as follows:

Section VIII. Heavy Bomber Distinguishing Features

1. United States of America
(a) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments
(i) For Heavy Bombers
(A) Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:
(B) Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:
(C) Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:
(D) Technical Data for Recognition of Heavy Bombers:
(b) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-nuclear ~rmaments’ Differences that make heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments distinguishable from heavy bombers of this type equipped for nuclear armaments:
(i) For Heavy Bombers
(A) Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:
Distinguishing features of B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall be recorded in accordance with subparagraph l(b) of this Section, based on the results of the exhibition conducted in accordance with the First Agreed Statement contained in Part Nine of this Protocol.
(B) Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:
(C) Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:
2. Russian Federation
(a) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments
(i) For Heavy Bombers
(A) Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:
(B) Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:
(C) Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:
(D) Technical Data for Recognition of Heavy Bombers:
(b) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-nuclear Armaments Differences that make heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments distinguishable from heavy bombers of this type equipped for nuclear armaments:
(i) For Heavy Bombers
(A) Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:
(B) Distinguishing Features Under Wing/ Fuselage:
(C) Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

Section IX. Other Data Required by the Treaty

1. Notwithstanding subparagraph 3(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM may be located at the locations provided for in this paragraph where static testing or static firing is conducted. Such first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs shall continue to be declared for the facility at which such first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs were located prior to their movement to the locations provided for in this paragraph.
(a) Russian Federation
(b) United States of America
2. To each Party, ICBMs, SLBMs, submarines, heavy bombers, inspection airplanes, and, where applicable, variants referred to in the Treaty, are known as follows:

3. For each Party, the inspection activity sites associated with points of entry are as follows:
4. For each Party, the facilities not subject to inspection are as follows:
5. For each Party, the airports for the points of entry are as follows:
(a) United States of America Point of Entry Airports
(b) Russian Federation Point of Entry Airports
6. For each Party, the routes for flights of inspection airplanes to points of entry are as follows:
(a) For flights of inspection airplanes of the Russian Federation to the United States of America: Route to Point Route from Point of Entry of Entry From to:
(b) For flights of inspection airplanes of the United States of America to the Russian Federation:
Route to Point Route from Point of Entry of Entry From to:
7. For each Party, formerly declared facilities that, in accordance with Section VII of Part Three of this Protocol, are considered eliminated for the purposes of the Treaty and notification of elimination of which has been provided in accordance with Section I1 of Part Four of this Protocol, are as follows:
8. For each Party, currently or formerly declared facilities, portions of which have been excluded, in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol, for the purposes of the Treaty from within the boundaries specified on the inspection site diagrams of such facilities, and notification of changes in the boundaries of which has been provided in accordance with Section VI of Part Four of this Protocol, are as follows:
(a) Russian Federation Function of the Facility that Incorporated Excluded Portions:

PART THREE -CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION PROCEDURES

Section I. General Provisions

1. Conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty shall be carried out in situ or at declared facilities.
2. Elimination of strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty shall be carried out by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose. Upon completion of elimination, an eliminated strategic offensive arm shall cease to be subject to the Treaty.
3. If an ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher is converted to a launcher of ICBMs or a launcher of SLBMs of another type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or a launcher of SLBMs of the type to which it was converted. If an ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber is converted by rendering it incapable of employing ICBMs, SLBMs, or nuclear armaments, so that the other Party can confirm the results of the conversion, such a converted strategic offensive arm shall cease to be subject to the aggregate numbers provided for in Article I1 of the Treaty and may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty.
4. If one of the Parties decides to carry out a conversion or elimination of a type of strategic offensive arm subject to the Treaty using procedures that it developed in accordance with this Part, it shall notify the other Party of such procedures in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol. If, in the opinion of the other Party, the procedures developed by the Party carrying out the conversion or elimination are ambiguous or do not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section, the Party carrying out the conversion or elimination shall conduct a demonstration, within the framework of the BCC, of the procedures that it developed. After the demonstration, such procedures shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC and may be used thereafter for conversion or elimination of that type of strategic offensive arm.
5. Upon completion of conversion of the first item of a type of strategic offensive arm subject to the Treaty, the Party carrying out the conversion shall conduct an exhibition in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty.
6. The results of conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms and facilities subject to the Treaty may be confirmed in accordance with Articles X and XI of the Treaty.

Section 11. Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs

1. Procedures for elimination of liquid-fueled ICBMs or liquid-fueled SLBMs shall be determined by the Party carrying out the elimination. Upon completion of the elimination procedures, notification thereof shall be provided.
2. The elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs shall be carried out using any of the procedures provided for in this paragraph:
(a) If the first stage is destroyed by explosion, notification thereof shall be provided.
(b) If the fuel is removed by burning, the first stage rocket motor case shall have a hole, no less than one meter in diameter, cut or punched through the case along the lateral
surface, or the first stage rocket motor case shall be cut into two parts of approximately equal size.
(c) If the fuel is removed by washing, the first stage rocket motor case shall be crushed, flattened, or cut into two parts of approximately equal size.
3. Upon completion of the elimination procedure in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) or 2(c) of this Section and provision of notification thereof, the eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for a 60-day period. The Party receiving such notification shall have the right, within a 30-day period beginning on the date of provision of notification, to conduct an inspection of the eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs. If a Party accumulates eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs, the specified eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs shall cease to be subject to the Treaty upon completion of the inspection or, if the inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 30-day period. Eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs that have not been accumulated shall cease to be subject to the Treaty upon completion of the inspection or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 60-day period.
4. The elimination of launch canisters for ICBMs and SLBMs shall be carried out by separating the launch canister into two parts. Upon completion of the elimination procedure and provision of notification thereof, the parts of the launch canister for ICBMs and SLBMs shall remain visible to national technical means of verification at the declared facility for a 60-day period. Upon expiration of the 60-day period, the launch canister shall be considered to be eliminated.
5. Upon completion of the elimination process for launch canisters for ICBMs and SLBMs, the launch canisters may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty but shall not be transferred to a third party.

Section 111. Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of ICBM Launchers

1. A silo launcher of ICBMs shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and for a 60-day period following provision of notification of the completion of the elimination process.
2. The elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out using any of the procedures provided for in this paragraph:
(a) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed, and the silo headworks and the silo shall be destroyed by excavating them to a depth of no less than eight meters or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters;
(b) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed and the silo shall be completely filled with debris resulting from demolition of infrastructure, and with earth or gravel. The silo door shall not be reinstalled; or
(c) Other procedures that are developed by the Party carrying out the elimination.
3. Upon completion of the elimination procedures in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section and provision of notification thereof, the area where the eliminated silo launcher of ICBMs was located may be graded after expiration of the 60-day period. The Party receiving such notification shall have the right, within a 30-day period beginning on the date of provision of notification, to conduct an inspection of the eliminated silo launcher of ICBMs. Upon expiration of the 60-day period following provision of such notification or upon completion of the inspection, the silo launcher of ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the Treaty.
4. The elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out by cutting the erector-launcher mechanism, leveling supports, and mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism from the launcher chassis and by removing the missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, from the launcher chassis.
5. If the chassis of the eliminated mobile launcher of ICBMs is used at a declared facility for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, the upper surfaces of the vehicle and of the items mounted on the chassis, visible to national technical means of verification, shall be painted so that they are distinguishable from the upper surfaces of a deployed mobile
launcher of ICBMs.
6. Upon completion of the elimination procedure in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section and provision of notification thereof, the eliminated mobile launcher of ICBMs shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for a 60- day period. The Party receiving such notification shall have the right, within a 30-day period beginning on the date of provision of notification, to conduct an inspection of the eliminated mobile launcher of ICBMs. If a Party accumulates eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs, the specified launchers shall cease to be subject to the Treaty, with the exception of the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, upon completion of the inspection or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 30-day period. Eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not been accumulated shall cease to be subject to the Treaty, with the exception of the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, upon completion of the inspection or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 60-day period.
7. Upon completion of the elimination process for the mobile launcher of ICBMs, the vehicle may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty.
8. Conversion of an ICBM launcher to a launcher of ICBMs of another type shall be carried out using procedures developed by the Party carrying out the conversion. Upon completion of the conversion procedures and provision of notification thereof, the converted launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs of the other type.

Section IV. Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers

1. The elimination of SLBM launchers shall be carried out by removing all missile launch tube hatches, their associated superstructure fairings, and, if applicable, gas generators.
2. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section and provision of notification thereof, the SLBM launchers shall cease to be subject to the Treaty.
3. A submarine on which SLBM launchers have been eliminated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Section shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for a 60- day period following provision of notification.
4. Upon expiration of the 60-day period provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section, scrapping of the submarine shall be carried out at the facility at which it is located, or the submarine may be moved for this purpose to another declared facility, notification of which shall be provided. After provision of notification of the completion of scrapping, the submarine shall cease to be subject to the Treaty.
5. Conversion of an SLBM launcher to a launcher of SLBMs of another type shall be carried out using procedures developed by the Party carrying out the conversion. Upon completion of the conversion procedures and provision of notification thereof, the converted launcher of SLBMs shall be considered to be a launcher of SLBMs of the other type.
6. Conversion of an SLBM launcher that precludes its use as an SLBM launcher shall be carried out using any of the procedures provided for in this paragraph:
(a) The height or diameter of the launcher shall be reduced so that the launcher can no longer contain the smallest SLBM deployed by the Party carrying out the conversion;
(b) Critical components required to launch an SLBM shall be removed. Such critical components may include, among other things, gas generators and launch-related subsystems; or
(c) Other procedures that are developed by the Party carrying out the conversion.
7. Upon completion of the conversion procedures in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Section and provision of notification thereof, the submarine shall be made available for viewing upon return to the submarine base. The Party receiving such notification shall have the right, within a 30-day period beginning on the date of provision of notification, to conduct an inspection of the converted launcher of SLBMs in order to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section have been completed. The submarine shall remain at the submarine base until an inspection is completed, or, if an inspection was not conducted, until expiration of the 30- day period. Upon completion of the inspection, or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 30-day period, the SLBM launcher shall be considered to be converted.

Section V. Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers

1. The elimination of a heavy bomber shall be carried out by cutting a wing or tail section from the fuselage at locations obviously not assembly joints, or by cutting the fuselage into two parts at a location obviously not an assembly joint.
2. A heavy bomber shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and for a 60-day period following provision of notification of the completion of the elimination. Upon expiration of the 60- day period, the heavy bomber shall cease to be subject to the Treaty.
3. The conversion process for a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall be carried out using any of the procedures provided for in this paragraph:
(a) All weapons bays and all external attachments for pylons shall be modified so as to render them incapable of employing nuclear armaments;
(b) All internal and external launcher assemblies shall be modified so as to render them incapable of employing nuclear armaments; or
(c) Other procedures that are developed by the Party carrying out the conversion.
4. Upon completion of the conversion procedures in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section and provision of notification thereof, the converted heavy bomber shall not be flown but shall be moved directly to the viewing site at the facility at which the conversion was carried out. The Party receiving such notification shall have the right, within a 30-day period beginning on the date of provision of notification, to conduct an inspection of the converted heavy bomber in order to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section have been completed. The converted heavy bomber shall remain at the viewing site at the facility at which the conversion was carried out until an inspection is completed, or, if an inspection was not conducted, until expiration of the 30-day period. Upon completion of the inspection, or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 30-day period, the heavy bomber shall be considered to be converted.

Section VI. Other Means for Removal from Accountability

1. A strategic offensive arm shall cease to be subject to the Treaty if:
(a) A strategic offensive arm is lost as a result of an accident or is disabled beyond repair;
(b) A strategic offensive arm is placed on static display;
(c) A heavy bomber is converted for use as a ground trainer; or
(d) An ICBM or SLBM is eliminated by launch, static testing, or static firing.
2. Prior to the placement of a strategic offensive arm on static display or prior to the use of a heavy bomber as a ground trainer, such a strategic offensive arm shall be rendered inoperable.
3. An ICBM or SLBM shall cease to be subject to the Treaty on the date of the launch, static testing, or static firing as specified in the notification.

Section VII. Procedures for Elimination of Facilities

1. The elimination of declared facilities shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification and shall be carried out by removal or elimination of all strategic offensive arms specified for such a facility, as well as training models of missiles, training launchers, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, launch-associated vehicles, and driver training vehicles.
2. The elimination process for fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out by dismantling and removing the superstructure of the fixed structure from the facility. No structure or covering, permanent or temporary, shall be reinstalled or built over the remaining foundation.
3. The declared facility shall be considered to be eliminated following completion of the procedures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section and provision of notification thereof.

PART FOUR -NOTIFICATIONS

Section I. General Provisions

1. The Parties shall provide notifications provided for in Article VII of the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of this Part and of the Annex on Notifications to this Protocol.
2. The time and date in a notification shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. The date of provision of notification shall be the date of receipt of the notification. The notification shall become effective either on the date it was received or on the date of the occurrence of the event specified in the notification.

Section 11. Notifications Concerning Data Pertaining to Strategic Offensive Arms

1. Notification, to be provided no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, providing data current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty for each category of data contained in Part Two of this Protocol.
2. Notification, to be provided no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following the entry into force of the Treaty, providing updated data for each category of data contained in Part Two of this Protocol. The first of these six-month periods shall begin the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the Treaty enters into force.
3. Notification, to be provided no later than five days after it occurs, of each change in data for each category of data contained in Part Two of this Protocol, unless the notification of such change in data has been provided in accordance with other provisions of this Part. Notification of each change in data on warheads shall be provided only in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section. The changes in data of which notifications are provided shall include, among other things:
(a) The loss of an item as the result of an accident, disablement of an item beyond repair, placement of an item on static display, conversion of a heavy bomber for use as a ground trainer, launch of an ICBM or SLBM, static testing, or static firing.
(b) The emergence of new facilities, new types, variants of ICBMs and SLBMs, and new versions of mobile launchers of ICBMs.
(c) Elimination of an ICBM, ICBM launcher, SLBM, SLBM launcher, heavy bomber, or declared facility.
(d) A change of category of an existing facility.
(e) A change of category of an item from deployed to non-deployed or from non-deployed to deployed.
4. Notification, to be provided no later than five days after the arrival at a declared facility, of the first prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM of a new type.
5. Notification, to be provided no later than 30 days after the twentieth launch of a prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM of a type or no less than 30 days in advance of the deployment of the first ICBM or SLBM of the same type, that the prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of a new type.
6. Notification, to be provided no later than five days after the decision has been made, of the cessation of development of a prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM of a new type.
7. Notification, to be provided no later than five days after it has been completed, of the transfer of SLBMs to or from a third State in accordance with an existing pattern of cooperation.
8. Notification concerning a new kind of strategic offensive arm.

Section 111. Notifications Concerning Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms

1. Notification, to be provided no less than 48 hours in advance of the exit of solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs from production facilities, specified in accordance with Part Two of this Protocol.
2. Notification, to be provided no later than five days after the completion of the movement of ICBMs to or from a test range located outside a Party’s national territory, which a Party has used for conducting launches of ICBMs between December 5, 1994 and December 4, 2009.
3. Notification, to be provided no later than 24 hours after the visit of a heavy bomber of one of the Parties that is of a type subject to the Treaty has exceeded 24 hours in duration,
of the visit of such a heavy bomber to a specific location inside its national territory or to a geographic region outside its national territory.
4. Notification, to be provided no later than 48 hours after departure, of the conclusion of the visit of a heavy bomber of a type subject to the Treaty, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section.
5. Notification, to be provided no less than 14 days in advance of the beginning of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, of the beginning of such an exercise. Such notification shall be provided in accordance with the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989.
6. Notification, to be provided no later than 48 hours after the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, of the completion of such an exercise.

Section IV. Notifications Concerning Launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, and the Exchange of Telemetric Information

1. Notification, to be provided no less than 24 hours in advance of any launch of an ICBM or SLBM. Such notification shall be provided in accordance with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988.
2. Notification, to be provided no later than 180 days after the receipt of the recording media and interpretive data, concerning the incomplete or insufficient quality of the recording media provided, the telemetric information recorded on it, or the interpretive data.
3. Notification, to be provided no later than 60 days after receipt of the notification provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section, containing an explanation concerning theincomplete or insufficient quality of the recording media provided, the telemetricinformation recorded on it, or the interpretive data.
4. Notification, to be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the demonstration, of the proposed date and place for the demonstration of the recording media and/or appropriate playback equipment.
5. Notification containing a request to acquire playback equipment for telemetric information, or its spare parts, or the response to such a request. The response to such a request shall be provided no later than 30 days after receipt of the request.
6. Notification containing a request for maintenance or for training in the operation and maintenance of the telemetry playback equipment, or the response to such a request. The response to such a request shall be provided no later than 45 days after the receipt of the request.

Section V. Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination

1. For conversion or elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, launch canisters for ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and facilities:
(a) Notification, to be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of conversion or elimination, of the intent to carry out a conversion or elimination.
(b) Notification, to be provided no later than five days after the initiation of a conversion or elimination, of the initiation of a conversion or elimination.
(c) Notification, to be provided no later than five days after the completion of conversion or elimination procedures, of the completion of conversion or elimination procedures.
2. Notification, to be provided no later than 20 days after the beginning of each calendar year, of the number and types of strategic offensive arms scheduled for conversion or elimination during the year.

Section VI. Notifications Concerning Inspection Activities

1. Notification, to be provided no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, for the period until the end of the current calendar year and thereafter no less than 30 days prior to the beginning of each following calendar year, for the period until the end of that calendar year, of the standing diplomatic clearance number for inspection airplanes.
2. Notification, to be provided by the inspecting Party no less than six hours in advance of the planned time of departure of an inspection airplane from the last airfield prior to its entry into the airspace of the inspected Party, containing the flight plan for such an airplane.
3. Notification, to be provided by the inspected Party no less than three hours in advance of the planned time of departure of an inspection airplane from the last airfield prior to its entry into the airspace of the inspected Party, of a flight plan approval for such an airplane.
4. Notification, to be provided by a Party no less than 30 days prior to the implementation of a change, of the change to flight routes for inspection airplanes to or from a point of entry established on the territory of that Party.
5. Notification, to be provided no later than 25 days after entry into force of the Treaty, containing the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members.
6. Notification, to be provided no more than once in each 45- day period, of amendments to the lists of inspectors and aircrew members.
7. Notification, to be provided no later than 30 days after receipt of the notifications provided for in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, of agreement with or objection to each inspector or aircrew member proposed for inclusion on the lists, as well as, in the case of objection to an inspector or aircrew member already on the lists, of such objection.
8. Notification, to be provided simultaneously with the notification provided for in paragraph 2 of Section I1 of this Part, containing the agreed lists of inspectors and aircrew members.
9. Notification, to be provided only during normal working days no less than 32 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, of an intention to conduct an inspection.
10. Notification, to be provided by the inspected Party no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, of the determination of agreed geographic coordinates of reference points used at the point of entry. Thereafter, the inspected Party shall provide supplementary notifications on each change to these reference points.
11. Notification of changes to the site diagrams of facilities and coastlines and waters diagrams.
12. Notification, to be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the planned date of an exhibition, of the intent to conduct an exhibition.
13. Notification, to be provided no less than 72 hours in advance of the planned date of an exhibition, of the intent to take part in an exhibition.
14. Notifications, to be provided by the inspection team leader, in writing, to a member of the in-country escort during inspections:
(a) Notification of the designation of the type of inspection and of the inspection site, to be provided at the point of entry no later than four hours after arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry or its return to the point of entry after the previous inspection. In the event that the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection without returning to the point of entry, such notification shall be provided prior to the completion of the post-inspection procedures of the previous inspection.
(b) Notification, to be provided simultaneously with the notification of the designation of the type of inspection and of the inspection site, of the intent to conduct a sequential inspection.
(c) Notification, to be provided at the point of entry or at the inspection site in the event of the cancellation of an inspection, of such cancellation.
(d) Notification, to be provided at the inspection site after completion of pre-inspection procedures, of the designation of an item intended for inspection.

Section VII. Notifications Concerning Activities of the BCC and Additional Messages

1. Notification, to be provided in accordance with Part Six of this Protocol, containing a request to convene a session of the BCC.
2. Notification, to be provided in accordance with Part Six of this Protocol, containing a response to a request to convene a session of the BCC.
3. Notifications containing other messages relating to the activities of the BCC.
4. Notification containing a request for clarification of a notification.
5. Notification containing clarification, correction, or modification of a notification.
6. Notification of an additional message with respect to the Treaty.

PART FIVE -INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

Section I. General Provisions

1. For the purposes of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate the conduct of inspection activities by the other Party in accordance with the provisions of this Part.
2. Each Party shall have the right to begin inspection activities 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty and to conduct them thereafter.
3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party notifications relating to inspection activities in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol.
4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one inspection on the territory of the inspected Party at any one time.
5. In exceptional cases, and for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, the inspected Party may temporarily exempt from inspection activities appropriate facilities subject to Type One or Type Two inspections and appropriate facilities at which exhibitions are to be conducted. Notification thereof shall be provided through diplomatic channels along with an explanation of the reason for such exemption from inspection activities.

Section 11. Legal Status of Inspectors and Aircrew Members

1. Inspection activities shall be conducted by inspectors. Inspectors shall be transported to and from the territory of the inspected Party by inspection airplanes, commercial flights, and Open Skies airplanes.
2. The list of inspectors shall not contain at any one time more than 300 individuals. The number of individuals on the list of aircrew members shall be determined at the discretion of each Party, based on the premise that the number of aircrew members for each inspection airplane shall not exceed ten. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be citizens of the inspecting Party.
3. Each Party shall have the right to amend the lists of its inspectors and aircrew members no more than once in each 45- day period. With each amendment, the number of inspectors whose names are entered in the list of inspectors shall not exceed 30, and the number of aircrew members whose names are entered in the list of aircrew members shall not exceed 25. The Party receiving notification of an amendment to lists of inspectors or aircrew members shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol to the other Party of its agreement with, or objection to, the designation of each such inspector or aircrew member.
4. For each proposed inspector and aircrew member, the lists shall contain first name, middle name or patronymic, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; place of birth (city, state or oblast, and country); and passport number, if available.
5. The initial exchange of lists of inspectors and aircrew members shall take place no later than 25 days after entry into force of the Treaty. No later than 30 days after the initial exchange of lists or after receipt of a notification of amendments to the lists of inspectors and aircrew members, the Party receiving such lists or proposed amendments thereto shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed, as may be required to ensure that each inspector or aircrew member may enter, remain in, and leave the territory of that Party throughout the in-country period. The inspected Party shall ensure that such visas and appropriate documents shall be valid for a period of no less than 24 months, and the inspecting Party shall ensure that individuals receiving such visas and appropriate documents use them only for the purpose of conducting inspection activities in accordance with this Part.
6. An individual included on the list of inspectors may be objected to only if that individual is under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party, if that individual has been convicted in a criminal prosecution or expelled by the Party reviewing the list, or if that individual has been previously deleted from the list at the request of the inspected Party for having violated the conditions governing inspection activities as provided for in this Part. An individual included on the list of aircrew members may be objected to if that individual is found unacceptable by the Party reviewing the list. The Party making an objection to such individual shall so notify the other Party in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol. Individuals who are objected to shall be deleted from the lists.
7. In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purposes of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, the inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities for the entire time the inspectors or aircrew members are within the territory of the other Party:
(a) Such personnel shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961, and the immunities accorded to diplomatic agents in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of that Convention.
(b) The papers and correspondence of such personnel shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.
(c) Inspection airplanes transporting inspection teams to and from the points of entry shall be inviolable.
(d) Inspectors and aircrew members shall have the right to bring into the territory of the inspected Party, without payment of any customs duties and related taxes and charges, articles for their personal use, provided, however, that they shall not be permitted to bring into the territory of the inspected Party any articles, the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations of the inspected Party.
(e) If the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred. If it is determined that such an abuse has occurred, the inspecting Party shall take necessary measures to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.
(f) During their stay in the territory of the inspected Party, without prejudice to the privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph, inspectors and aircrew members shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected Party, shall be obliged not to interfere in its internal affairs, and shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected Party.
8. Upon completion of their official functions on the territory of the inspected Party, with respect to acts performed by inspectors and aircrew members in the exercise of their official functions, the immunity of such personnel shall continue to subsist to the extent that immunity continues to subsist with respect to persons enjoying privileges and immunities in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

Section 111. Arrangements for Air Transportation

1. Each Party shall establish on its territory two points of entry. The points of entry, airports associated with them, and their associated inspection activity sites shall be provided in accordance with Part Two of this Protocol.
2. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use agreed types of inspection airplanes for the transportation of inspectors to the points of entry on the territory of the inspected Party. Such airplanes may, at the same time that they are transporting inspectors, carry equipment intended for inspection activities. The inspecting Party shall provide the relevant notification of each flight of an inspection airplane transporting inspectors.
3. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights to transport inspectors to those points of entry that are served by such airplanes. The provisions of this Part shall not apply to airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights that are used for the transportation of inspectors to points of entry, and to their aircrews.
4. Each Party may use Open Skies airplanes making observation flights over the territory of the inspected Party for the transportation of inspectors to and/or from the points of entry so long as the inspecting Party complies with the provisions provided for in paragraph 19 of Section V of this Part.
5. The routes for flights of inspection airplanes to and from the points of entry shall be provided in accordance with Part Two of this Protocol. Flight plans shall be filed in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol.
6. The inspected Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for inspection airplanes of the inspecting Party at the point of entry. The cost of parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, ground technical and commercial services as well as additional services as requested, for each such airplane, shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

Section IV. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry

1. The inspection team and aircrew members shall arrive at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party that is associated with the inspection activity site. Upon arrival at the point of entry, the in-country escort shall meet the inspection team and aircrew members and shall expedite their entry and the entry of their baggage and equipment intended for use during inspection activities, which shall be exempt from all customs duties and related taxes and charges. The in-country escort shall accompany the inspection team and assist it in exercising its functions during the entire period it is in the territory of the inspected Party. Storage of equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within a secure structure or room.
2. As soon as an airplane lands, diplomatic officials from the embassy or consulate of the inspecting Party shall also meet the inspection team and aircrew members. Diplomatic officials may accompany inspectors only during their stay at the point of entry, but may accompany the aircrew members during the entire period they are in the territory of the inspected Party.
3. An inspector shall be considered to have assumed the duties of an inspector upon arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party and shall be considered to have ceased performing those duties after departure from the territory of the inspected Party through the point of entry.

4. Equipment that the inspecting Party brings into the country shall be subject to examination each time it is brought into the country. Such equipment shall be examined by the in-country escort, in the presence of inspectors. The purpose of such examination shall be to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment cannot perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspection activities. The examination of the equipment shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection activity site. The list of inspection equipment and the procedures for its examination and use are specified in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
5. At the point of entry, the inspection team leader shall, at or before the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol, designate, in writing, to the inspected Party through the in-country escort, the type of inspection and the inspection site.
6. For Type One inspections:
(a) A member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader no later than two hours after designation of the inspection site, prior to the departure of the inspection team to the inspection site, of the number of deployed ICRMs or deployed SLBMs located at the designated base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented, or deployed heavy bombers that are based at the designated base and those temporarily located at such a base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented.
(b) If at the designated base, less than 50 percent of the deployed ICBMs based at the ICBM base are present, less than 30 percent of deployed SLBMs contained in SLBM launchers installed on ballistic missile submarines based at the submarine base are present, or less than 70 percent of the deployed heavy bombers based at the air base are present, no later than one hour after the information contained in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph has been provided, the inspection team leader shall have the right to:
(i) Inform a member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated base shall take place; or
(ii) Designate another inspection site associated with the same point of entry; or
(iii) Decline to conduct the inspection and leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this event, the number of such inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
(c) For sequential inspections, the procedures provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be carried out at the location at which the inspection team leader designates the subsequent inspection site.
7. The activities of inspection teams on the territory of the inspected Party may be covered by the mass media only at the point of entry. The inspected Party shall determine the appropriate procedures.

Section V. General Rules for the Conduct of Inspection Activities

1. Inspectors shall discharge their functions in accordance with this Part.
2. The inspected Party shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the inspectors and aircrew members of the inspecting Party throughout the in-country period. Costs of all such services shall be borne by the inspected Party.
3. The inspecting Party shall ensure that its inspectors not publicly disclose information obtained during inspection activities except with the express consent of the inspecting Party. Such consent shall be granted only with the express consent of the inspected Party. The inspecting Party shall ensure that its inspectors remain bound by this obligation even after termination of their activities as inspectors.
4. The boundaries of the inspection sites shall be the boundaries depicted on the inspection site diagrams that are exchanged by the Parties in accordance with Part Two of this Protocol.
5. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall communicate with personnel of the inspected Party only through the in-country escort. Except as provided for in this Protocol, inspectors shall not interfere with activities being conducted at the inspected facility and shall not hamper or delay the operation of a facility. Inspectors shall take no actions affecting the safe operation of a facility. Inspectors shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection activity site. The in-country escort shall provide safety briefings. The inspected Party shall provide, as necessary, individual protective gear.
6. At the inspection activity site, representatives of the inspected facility shall be included among the in-country escort. The inspected Party shall ensure that a member of the in-country escort at the facility is continuously available to inspectors either in person or by telephone. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party shall ensure that the inspectors can be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located on the territory of the inspected Party using telephonic communications provided by the inspected Party. The inspected Party shall also provide means of communication between inspection team subgroups at the inspection activity site. All such means of communication shall be under the control of the inspected Party. The in-country escort shall ensure necessary lighting for inspectors at the inspection activity site to carry out the procedures provided for in this Protocol.
7. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team, as well as its equipment and documents, from the point of entry to the inspection site no later than 24 hours after the time of the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol.
8. During inspection activities, inspectors shall have the right to use any of the equipment in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol for specific kinds of inspection activities, except for cameras, which shall be used only by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party.
9. During inspection activities, inspectors shall have the right to view and make linear measurements of items located at the inspection activity site in order to confirm the accuracy of the declared technical data provided in accordance with Part Two of this Protocol. Such measurements shall be recorded during inspection activities and shall be certified by the signatures of an inspector and a member of the in- country escort immediately after they are taken. Such certified data shall be included in the inspection activity report.
10. For the purposes of this Protocol, an item of inspection, about which technical data has been provided in accordance with Part Two of this Protocol, is understood to mean:
(a) For inspections of heavy bombers at air bases, storage facilities for heavy bombers, and conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers within the boundaries depicted on the inspection site diagram, a heavy bomber of the inspected Party.
(b) For inspections at facilities other than those specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, an ICBM or SLBM, a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM maintained, stored, and transported in stages, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs of the inspected Party.
11. For each Party, the size criteria used during inspections shall be provided in accordance with Part Two of this Protocol.
12. During an inspection, inspectors shall have the right to request clarification through the in-country escort. The in-country escort shall provide clarifications that may be useful in resolving questions and ambiguities. In the event questions and ambiguities relating to an object or building located within the inspection site are not resolved, the inspected Party shall photograph such object or such building at the request of the inspecting Party.
13. An inspection team conducting inspection activities shall include no more than ten inspectors. Upon arrival at the inspection activity site, the inspection team leader shall have the right to establish subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each.
14. Pre-inspection procedures, including safety briefings and the provision of information relating to the conduct of the inspection activities and the inspection activity site, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection activity site and shall be completed within one hour, after which the inspection activities shall begin immediately.
15. Upon completion of pre-inspection procedures, no object, container, or vehicle large enough to be or contain an item of inspection shall leave the inspection site until inspected by the inspection team or released by the inspection team if it does not intend to inspect such object, container, or vehicle. Such inspections shall be conducted so as not to hamper or delay the operation of the facility.
16. Periods of inspection activities shall be as follows:
(a) For Type One inspections at ICBM bases and submarine bases, the period of inspection activities for the inspection of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs shall not exceed the period of time necessary to achieve the purpose of the inspection and shall terminate upon completion of the inspection procedures. The period of inspection activities for the inspection of non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs at such bases shall not exceed 24 hours after the completion of the inspection of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs.
(b) For Type One inspections at air bases, the period of inspection activities shall not exceed 30 hours.
(c) For Type Two inspections, except for inspections provided for in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the period of inspection activities shall not exceed 24 hours.
(d) For Type Two inspections in order to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, silo launchers of ICBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated, or to confirm that SLBM launchers or heavy bombers have been converted, the period of inspection activities shall not exceed 12 hours.
(e) For exhibitions, the period of inspection activities shall not exceed the period of time necessary to achieve the purpose of the exhibition. For inspections, except for Type Two inspections in order to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated, the period of inspection activities may be extended, by agreement with the in-country escort, by no more than eight hours.
17. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection activity report, shall begin when the period of inspection activities expires and shall be completed as agreed by the Parties.
18. The inspection team shall have the right to conduct sequential inspections. The inspection team that conducted an inspection at a facility shall not have the right to designate the same facility for conducting a sequential inspection. The procedures for conducting sequential inspections are set forth in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
19. The inspection team shall depart from the territory of the inspected Party no later than 24 hours after its return to the point of entry, unless otherwise agreed.

Section VI. Inspections of ICBMs and SLBMs Including the Warheads on Them, Deployed Heavy Bombers Including the Nuclear Armaments Located on Them, and Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs and Launchers of SLBMs, Conducted in Accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Treaty (Type One Inspections)

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct Type One inspections at the facilities, and for the purposes, listed in this paragraph:
(a) At ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases, in order to confirm the accuracy of the declared data, specified for such bases, on the number and types of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, or deployed heavy bombers, deployed and non- deployed launchers ofICBMs or launchers of SLBMs, non-deployed ICBMs or non-deployed SLBMs, on thenumber of warheads on deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs, or on the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers.
(b) At submarine bases, in order to confirm, as provided for in Part Nine of this Protocol, that converted launchers of SLBMs have not been reconverted and remain incapable of launching SLBMs. (cj At air bases, in order to confirm, as provided for in Part Nine of this Protocol, that the heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments have not been reconverted and remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments.
2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of no more than ten Type One inspections each year, with no more than two facilities being inspected twice each year. Neither Party shall have the right to conduct a Type One inspection simultaneously with other kinds of inspection activities at the same facility.
3. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided earlier with respect to such an inspection in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the pre-inspection restrictions specified in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol at the ICBM base or submarine base, including the waters identified on the coastlines and waters diagram, or at the air base.
4. Inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases shall be conducted in order to confirm:
(a) The accuracy of the declared data on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs located at the ICBM base, or on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs located at the submarine base, at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented.
(b) The accuracy of the declared data on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs located at the ICBM base, or on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed SLBMs located at the submarine base, or on the number and types of deployed heavy bombers located at the air base, at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented.
(c) The actual number of reentry vehicles emplaced on a designated deployed ICBM or emplaced on a designated deployed SLBM, or the number of nuclear armaments located on designated deployed heavy bombers.
5. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader, in writing, information on:
(a) For ICBM bases:
(i) The aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs based at the ICBM base;
(ii) The number of deployed ICBMs of each type, based at the ICBM base;
(iii) The number of deployed launchers of ICBMs of each type located at the ICBM base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented;
(iv) The number of reentry vehicles emplaced on each deployed ICBM;
(v) The number of non-deployed launchers of ICBMs of each type located at the ICBM base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented; and
(vi) The number of non-deployed ICBMs of each type, first stages of ICBMs of each type, and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the ICBM base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented. In addition, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with one copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base, one copy of the inspection site diagram of the maintenance facility and, if applicable, one copy of the inspection site diagram of each basing area. The location of each of the declared items located at the ICBM base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented shall be depicted on the site diagrams of facilities. For an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, such information shall be provided only for those items located in basing areas and at the maintenance facility.
(b) For submarine bases:
(i) The aggregate number of warheads on deployed SLBMs contained in SLBM launchers installed on ballistic missile submarines based at the submarine base;
(ii) The number of ballistic missile submarines of each type based at the submarine base and the number of deployed SLBMs of each type;
(iii) The number of ballistic missile submarines of each type that contain deployed launchers of SLBMs and the number of deployed launchers of SLBMs of each type located at the submarine base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented;
(iv) The number of reentry vehicles emplaced on each deployed SLBM;
(v) The number of ballistic missile submarines of each type based at the submarine base that contain non-deployed launchers of SLBMs and the number of non-deployed launchers of SLBMs of each type;
(vi) The number of ballistic missile submarines of each type that contain non-deployed launchers of SLBMs and the number of non-deployed launchers of SLBMs of each type located at the submarine base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented; and
(vii) The number of non-deployed SLBMs of each type and first stages of SLBMs of each type located at the submarine base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented. In addition, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with one copy of the coastlines and waters diagram of the submarine base, one copy of the simplified site diagram of the submarine base, and one copy of the inspection site diagram of the location at which non-deployed SLBMs are stored. The location of each of the declared items located at the submarine base at the time pre- inspection restrictions were implemented shall be depicted on the coastlines and waters diagram of the submarine base and the inspection site diagram of the location at which non- deployed SLBMs are stored.
(c) For air bases:
(i) The aggregate number of nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers based at the air base;
(ii) The number of deployed heavy bombers of each type based at the air base;
(iii) The specific location inside the national territory of the inspected Party of each deployed heavy bomber based at the air base that was absent from that base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented;
(iv) The specific geographic region outside the national territory of the inspected Party where each deployed heavy bomber based at the air base that was absent from that base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented is located;
(v) The number and types of deployed heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments located at the air base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented; and
(vi) The number of nuclear armaments located on each
deployed heavy bomber located at the air base at the time pre- inspection restrictions were implemented. In addition, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with one copy of the inspection site diagram of the air base. The location of each of the declared heavy bombers located at the air base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented shall be depicted on the inspection site diagram of the air base.
(d) The number and types of items specified for an ICBM base, submarine base, or air base that were absent from the inspection site at the time of the arrival of the inspectionteam and the reason for the absence of each such item.
(e) In addition, for submarine bases and air bases a member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader, in writing, the information as provided for in Part Nine of this Protocol.
6. Upon completion of pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader shall designate for inspection, in writing, to a member of the in-country escort, using the geographic coordinates or pre-arranged designators or the site diagrams of facilities or coastlines and waters diagrams provided during pre-inspection procedures:
(a) For ICBM bases, one deployed launcher of ICBMs containing the deployed ICBM intended for inspection. The designated ICBM may be declared as containing reentry vehicles or as not containing reentry vehicles and thereafter shall be subject to inspection in order to confirm the declared number of reentry vehicles emplaced on it. In addition, the inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one non-deployed launcher of ICBMs. For an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, located in one of the basing areas that has been declared not to contain a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs, if such fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs not containing mobile launchers of ICBMs are located at that base. Mobile launchers of ICBMs located at a maintenance facility may not be designated for inspection to confirm the declared number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs contained on such mobile launchers of ICBMs.
(b) For submarine bases, one deployed launcher of SLBMs containing the deployed SLBM intended for inspection. The designated SLBM may be declared as containing reentry vehicles or as not containing reentry vehicles and thereafter shall be subject to inspection in order to confirm the declared number of reentry vehicles emplaced on it. In addition, the inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one non-deployed launcher of SLBMs. SLBM launchers installed on a submarine located in dry dock may not be designated for inspection and shall not be subject to inspection.
(c) For air bases, no more than three deployed heavy bombers. Test heavy bombers may not be designated for inspection and shall not be subject to inspection.
(d) In addition, for submarine bases and air bases, the inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection other items as provided for in Part Nine of this Protocol.
7. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to an ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or deployed heavy bombers designated for inspection or to other items designated for inspection in accordance with Part Nine of this Protocol, without undue delay and within the following periods of time:
(a) To a silo launcher of ICBMs, no later than 12 hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures;
(b) To an SLBM launcher or converted launcher of SLBMs, no later than three hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures;
(c) To a mobile launcher of ICBMs or a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, no later than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures; and
(d) To deployed heavy bombers or heavy bombers converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, no later than three hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures.
8. Inspectors shall have the right to read the unique identifiers on all designated deployed ICBMs or designated deployed SLBMs, non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and designated heavy bombers that are located at the inspection site, in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
9. The inspection team shall have the right to confirm that ICBMs or SLBMs declared to be training models of missiles are training models of missiles based on differences as provided for in Part Two of this Protocol, unless such items are contained in silo training launchers.
10. For ICBM bases, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect:
(a) The designated deployed launcher of ICBMs in order to confirm the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on the deployed ICBM contained on or in the launcher, as provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
(b) If applicable, the designated non-deployed launcher of ICBMs or designated fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs declared not to contain a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
(c) The maintenance facility in order to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the number and types of items specified during pre-inspection procedures, as provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
11. For submarine bases, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect:
(a) The designated deployed launcher of SLBMs in order to confirm the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on the deployed SLBM contained in the launcher, as provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
(b) If applicable, the designated non-deployed launcher of SLBMs, as provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
(c) The designated converted launchers of SLBMs, as provided for in Part Nine of the Protocol and in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
(d) The inspection site within the boundaries depicted on the inspection site diagram in order to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the number and types of items specified during pre-inspection procedures, as provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
12. For air bases, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect:
(a) The designated deployed heavy.bombers in order to confirm the number of nuclear armaments located on them, as provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
(b) The designated heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, as provided for in Part Nine of this Protocol and in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
(c) Structures within the boundaries depicted on the inspection site diagram of the air base declared not to contain a heavy bomber in order to confirm that such structures do not contain a heavy bomber.
13. If an inspection team conducting an inspection of a designated launcher of ICBMs or launcher of S,LBMs declared not to contain a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM, or a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs declared not to contain a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs, discovers that such a launcher or such a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs contains a deployed ICBM or a deployed SLBM, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect the discovered ICBM or SLBM in order to determine the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on such a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM in addition to any other designated launchers, and to record the results of such an inspection in the inspection activity report. If an inspection team conducting an inspection of a designated deployed heavy bomber declared not to contain nuclear armaments discovers that such a heavy bomber contains nuclear armaments, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect such a deployed heavy bomber in order to determine the number of nuclear armaments located on such a heavy bomber, as provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol, and to record the results of such an inspection in the inspection activity report.
14. For a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM that was designated for the inspection of reentry vehicles, before the front section is viewed, the inspected Party may cover reentry vehicles and other equipment, including the mounting platform, with individual covers, in such a manner that the covers shall not hamper inspectors in ascertaining that the front section contains the number of reentry vehicles equal to the number of reentry vehicles declared for the deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM. Inspectors shall have the right to view such covers prior to their placement on the reentry vehicles. The inspection team shall conduct an inspection of reentry vehicles emplaced on a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM as provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
15. The time of completion of the procedures for the inspection of reentry vehicles for all designated launchers of ICBMs or launchers of SLBMs shall be agreed upon by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort and shall be recorded in the inspection activity report.
16. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in this Section, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the location designated by the inspected Party to conduct post-inspection procedures.

Section VII. Inspections of Non-deployed Strategic Offensive Arms, Converted or Eliminated Strategic Offensive Arms, Deployed Heavy Bombers at Storage Facilities for Heavy Bombers, and Formerly Declared Facilities, Conducted in Accordance with Paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty (Type Two Inspections)

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct Type Two inspections at the facilities, and for the purposes, listed in this paragraph:
(a) At ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; and training facilities, in order to confirm the accuracy of declared technical characteristics and declared data, specified for such facilities, on the number and types of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, and non- deployed launchers of ICBMs.
(b) At formerly declared facilities, which are provided for in Part Two of this Protocol and were subject to inspection prior to their elimination, in order to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. If heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are based at formerly declared facilities, inspections shall be conducted in accordance with Part Nine of this Protocol in order to confirm that such heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments.
(c) At ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs, in order to confirm that silo launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol. During such inspections, no other items and no other portions of such ICBM bases shall be subject to inspection.
(d) At submarine bases, in order to confirm that SLBM launchers installed on ballistic missile submarines have been converted in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol. During such inspections, no other items and no other portions of such submarine bases shall be subject to inspection.
(e) At conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMS, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, in order to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol.
(f) At conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers, in order to confirm that heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments have been converted in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol.
(g) At storage facilities for heavy bombers, in order to confirm the accuracy of declared data, specified for such facilities, on the number and types of deployed and non- deployed heavy bombers and on the number of nuclear armaments located on such heavy bombers, in accordance with Part Nine of this Protocol.
2. Except as provided for in Part Nine of this Protocol, each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of no more than eight Type Two inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections being conducted each year at the same facility.
3. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided earlier with respect to such an inspection in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement, at the designated inspection site, the pre- inspection restrictions specified in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol, which shall remain in effect until the pre-inspection procedures are completed.
4. Type Two inspections in order to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated shall be conducted after receiving notification in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol from the Party carrying out the elimination of such items:
(a) During the period of time specified in the corresponding notification, when eliminated solid-fueled missiles or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs are accumulated at a conversion or elimination facility in a quantity defined in this paragraph; or
(b) At any other period of time, not coinciding with the accumulation specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph. In such a case, eliminated solid-fueled missiles or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs are not accumulated. Only those eliminated solid-fueled missiles or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the conversion or elimination facility at that time shall be subject to inspection. A Party carrying out an elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs shall conduct, within a calendar year, two accumulations of eliminated solid-fueled missiles and two accumulations of eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs at the appropriate conversion or elimination facility. These accumulations shall be conducted in such a manner that no less than 50 percent of the total number of missiles and no less than 50 percent of the total number of mobile launchers of ICBMs scheduled for elimination during a calendar year will be made available for inspection during the two inspections conducted during the period of time specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph at each appropriate facility. Each such accumulation shall contain approximately 25 percent of the total number of solid-fueled ICBMs or solid-fueled SLBMs, or approximately 25 percent of the total number ofmobile launchers of ICBMs, scheduled for elimination during the corresponding calendar year. The Party conducting the accumulation of eliminated solid- fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs shall provide a notification, in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol, of the beginning of such an accumulation. The Party conducting such an accumulation shall also inform the other Party, in a notification provided in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol, of the date of completion of the accumulation process, the number of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs or solid-fueled SLBMs, or the number of eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs, as well as the unique identifiers of the eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs or solid-fueled SLBMs.
5. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader, in writing, information on the number, and, as applicable, on the type, category, variant, and version of:
(a) For facilities specified in subparagraphs l(a) and l(b) of this Section, non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, test launchers, training launchers, and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs located at that inspection site at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented. At the same time, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with one copy of the simplified site diagram of the facility, if applicable, and one copy of the inspection site diagram. The inspection site diagram shall be annotated to depict, if applicable, the location, within the boundaries of the inspection site, of such items and the structures or vehicles in which they are located. If any of the items specified in accordance with Part Two of this Protocol for an inspection site are absent from the inspection site at the time of the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in- country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the type and, if applicable, variant, and the reason for the absence of each such item.
(b) For facilities specified in subparagraph l(c) of this Section, eliminated silo launchers of ICBMs that are subject to inspection. At the same time, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with one copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base, annotated to depict the location of each such silo launcher of ICBMs.
(c) For facilities specified in subparagraph 1 (d) of this Section, converted launchers of SLBMs that are subject to inspection. At the same time, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with one copy of the coastlines and waters diagram, annotated to depict the location of the ballistic missile submarines on which such converted launchers of SLBMs are installed.
(d) For facilities specified in subparagraph l(e) of this Section, eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs that are subject to inspection. At the same time, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with one copy of the inspection site diagram, annotated to depict the location of such eliminated items and the structures or vehicles in which they are located.
(e) For facilities specified in subparagraph l(f) of this Section, converted heavy bombers that are subject to inspection. At the same time, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with one copy of the inspection site diagram, annotated to depict the location of such converted heavy bombers and the structures in which they are located.
(f) For facilities specified in subparagraph l(g) of this Section, heavy bombers located at the inspection site at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented.
6. The inspection team shall have the right to inspect, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol:
(a) For ICBM loading facilities, SLBM loading facilities, storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; training facilities; and formerly declared facilities other than formerly declared facilities at which heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are based, the inspection site within the boundaries of the inspection site, including structures large enough to contain an item of inspection. For test ranges the same procedures shall apply, with the following exceptions:
(i) In carrying out the procedures provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol, the inspected Party shall not be required to remove non-deployed ICBMs or non-deployed SLBMs from test launchers or soft-site launchers. Such non-deployed ICBMs or non-deployed SLBMs shall not be subject to measurement.
(ii) For silo test launchers of ICBMs, regardless of where they are depicted on the simplified site diagram of the test range, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, at its choice, no more than one silo test launcher of ICBMs that the inspected Party declares not to contain an ICBM or a training model of a missile. Inspection of such a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol in order to confirm that it does not contain an ICBM.
(b) For formerly declared facilities at which heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are based, designated converted heavy bombers, in accordance with Part Nine of this Protocol.
(c) For ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs, eliminated silo launchers of ICBMs, in order to confirm that such silo launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol, and the number of such eliminated silo launchers of ICBMs declared during pre- inspection procedures.
(d) For submarine bases, converted launchers of SLBMs, in order to confirm that such SLBM launchers have been converted in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol, and the number of such converted launchers of SLBMs declared during pre- inspection procedures.
(e) For conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, eliminated solid-fueled SLBMs, or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs, in order to confirm that such items have been eliminated in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol, and the number of such eliminated items declared during pre-inspection procedures.
(f) For conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers, heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments, in order to confirm that such heavy bombers have been converted in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol, and the number of such converted heavy bombers declared during pre-inspection procedures.
(g) For storage facilities for heavy bombers, all deployed heavy bombers, in accordance with Part Nine of this Protocol.
7. Inspectors shall have the right to read the unique identifiers on all non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, eliminated solid-fueled SLBMs, as well as on all heavy bombers, located at the inspection site, except for ICBMs or SLBMs contained in test launchers and in soft-site launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs.
8. The inspection team shall have the right to confirm that all launch canisters located within the boundaries of the inspection site declared to be empty are, in fact, empty.
9. Notwithstanding other provisions of this Protocol, silo training launchers of ICBMs and test heavy bombers shall not be subject to inspection.
10. The inspection team shall have the right to confirm that ICBMs or SLBMs declared to be training models of missiles are training models of missiles based on differences as provided for in Part Two of this Protocol, unless such items are contained in test launchers or in silo training launchers.

Section VIII. Exhibitions

1. Exhibitions shall be conducted at the invitation of the Party conducting the exhibition, separately from inspections, at the locations and in theperiods of time chosen by the Party conducting the exhibition, and in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
2. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right to take part in exhibitions conducted by the other Party, in order to demonstrate the distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of each new type, variant, or version of an ICBM, SLBM, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, and, as provided for in Part Two of this Protocol, an ICBM launcher, in the periods of time specified in corresponding notifications. If a Party declares a type, variant, or version of a strategic offensive arm prior to or at the time of entry into force of the Treaty for which no exhibition had been previously conducted in connection with fulfilling the requirements of the START Treaty, that Party shall conduct an exhibition. Such an exhibition shall be conducted no later than the date on which inspection activities begin, as provided for in Section I of this Part.
3. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right to take part in exhibitions conducted by the other Party, in order to demonstrate the results of the conversion of the first item of a type of ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments that was converted using conversion procedures in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol in the periods of time specified in corresponding notifications.
4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right to take part in exhibitions conducted by the other Party, as provided for in Part Nine of this Protocol.

Section IX. Cancellation of Inspection Activities

1. An inspection activity shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it cannot be conducted. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. For exhibitions cancelled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, the Parties shall agree on the new periods of time for conducting such exhibitions.
2. In the case of a delay, including a delay due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, that prevents an inspection team from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 7 of Section V of this Part, the inspection team leader may cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for that reason, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
3. At the inspection site, if the time to transport an inspection team or subgroup exceeds the corresponding time specified in paragraph 7 of Section VI of this Part, the inspection team leader may cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for that reason, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
4. If, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it is necessary to remove items subject to pre-inspection restrictions from the inspection site, the inspection team leader may cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for that reason, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
5. If the inspected Party interrupts the inspection for reasons of personnel security or equipment safety, the inspection team leader may cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for such reasons, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

Section X. Inspection Activity Reports

1. During post-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with an inspection activity report in written form, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages.
2. The report shall contain factual information. It shall indicate the kind of inspection activities conducted, the inspection activity site, the type and number of strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty that were declared during the pre-inspection procedures and that were observed during the period of inspection activities, and all measurements recorded during the period of inspection activities.
3. Site diagrams of facilities, coastlines and waters diagrams, and information provided, in writing, to the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures, as well as photographs taken during the period of inspection activities, shall be an integral part of the inspection activity report. The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and by a member of the in-country escort. The inspecting Party shall have the right to include in the report ambiguities or comments. The inspected Party shall have the right to include clarifications in the report. Each Party shall retain one original of the report.
4. The Parties shall, when possible, clarify ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the inspection activity report. Relevant clarifications shall be recorded in the report.

PART SIX -BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Section I. Authority of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)

To promote the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties within the framework of the BCC shall:
(a) Resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties.
(b) Agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.
(c) Discuss the unique features of missiles and their launchers, other than ICBMs and ICBM launchers, or SLBMs and SLBM launchers, referred to in paragraph 3 of Article V of the Treaty, that distinguish such missiles and their launchers from ICBMs and ICBM launchers, or SLBMs and SLBM launchers.
(d) Resolve questions related to the applicability of provisions of the Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm.
(e) Discuss other issues raised by either Party.

Section 11. Composition

1. Each Party shall communicate to the other Party through diplomatic channels the names of its designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the BCC.
2. Each Party shall have the right to be represented at a session of the BCC by its Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as by their alternates, members, advisors, and experts. A session of the BCC may be convened without the participation of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. In such a case, any other individual provided for in this paragraph may be the head representative of the Party to a session of the BCC.
3. The BCC shall have the right to constitute working groups consisting of any of the individuals provided for in paragraph
2 of this Section for the consideration of specific questions raised in the BCC.

Section 111. Convening a Session

1. A session of the BCC shall be convened at the request of either Party. No later than 15 days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Requests and responses shall include the following:
(a) The questions that the Party intends to raise.
(b) The name of the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, or the head representative of the Party.
(c) The proposed, accepted or alternate date and location for the convening of the session. Each Party may also submit additional questions to the other Party prior to the convening of the session. No fewer than two sessions of the BCC shall be convened each year, unless otherwise agreed.
2. A session of the BCC shall be convened not later than 45 days after the date proposed in the request provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section.
3. A session of the BCC shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, and shall remain in session for no more than 15 days, unless otherwise agreed.
4. The Commissioners of the Parties may communicate with each other during the intersessional period in order to clarify any unclear situations or to resolve questions.

Section IV. Agenda

1. The agenda for a session of the BCC shall consist of those questions that the Parties have specified in the communications provided to each other in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I11 of this Part.
2. Each Party shall have the right to raise in the BCC questions that arise during a session of the BCC, provided, however, that consideration of such questions during the current session requires agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the Parties shall allow sufficient time prior to consideration of such questions for preparation and for any changes in the composition of their delegations.

Section V. Work of the BCC

The work of the BCC shall be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the BCC. The BCC may record agreements reached or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Such documents shall not be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the BCC.

Section VI. Costs

Each Party shall bear the cost of its participation in the work of the BCC.

Section VII. Communications

Communications in accordance with this Part shall be provided through diplomatic channels or through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the Parties.

Section VIII. Additional Procedures

The Parties shall have the right to agree upon additional procedures governing the operation of the BCC.

PART SEVEN -TELEMETRIC INFORMATION

1. The Parties shall exchange telemetric information on an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but on no more than five launches of ICBMs and SLBMs each calendar year.
2. On an annual basis, within 65 days of the beginning of the calendar year, within the framework of the BCC, the Parties shall discuss the issue of the exchange of telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, focusing on launches conducted in the previous calendar year, on which an exchange of telemetric information will be carried out. Following discussion within the framework of the BCC, the Parties shall take an agreed decision on the number of such launches. The specific launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, on which telemetric information is provided, shall be determined by the conducting Party.
3. The conditions of and the procedures for the exchange, and the amount of telemetric information provided shall be determined in accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol.

PART EIGHT -PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Section I. General Provisions

Until entry into force of the Treaty, the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol, listed in this Part, shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Section 11. The Treaty

1. Paragraph 2 of Article I.
2. Paragraph 8 of Article 111.
3. Paragraph 2 of Article V.
4. Paragraph 1 of Article VI.
5. Paragraph 1 of Article VII.
6. Paragraph 2 of Article VII, only to the extent required to provide the notifications provided for in this Part.
7. Paragraph 3 of Article VII.
8. Paragraph 4 of Article VII.
9. Paragraph 5 of Article VII.
10. Paragraph 6 of Article VII.
11. Article VIII.
12. Article X.
13. Article XII.

Section 111. The Protocol

1. Part One.
2. Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7 of Section I of Part Two.
3. Paragraph 3 of Section IX of Part Two.
4. Part Three, only to the extent required for the implementation of this Part, but not to provide notifications on conversion or elimination or to make eliminated items visible to national technical means of verification.
5. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section I of Part Four.
6. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Section I11 of Part Four.
7. Paragraph 1 of Section IV of Part Four.
8. Section VII of Part Four.
9. Part Six.
10. Section I of Part Eight.

PART NINE -AGREED STATEMENTS

First Agreed Statement

Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers

The Parties agree that, with respect to all B-1B heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, and the facilities at which they are based, the following provisions shall apply.
1. No later than one year after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct a one-time exhibition of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments to demonstrate that the B-1B heavy bomber is incapable of employing nuclear armaments:
(a) Such an exhibition shall be conducted, as applicable, in accordance with the procedures of an exhibition specified in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol, as provided for in Section VIII of Part Five of this Protocol, to demonstrate the features that distinguish a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments converted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Part Three of this Protocol.
(b) On the basis of the results of the exhibition of the differences between a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments and a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, the distinguishing features shall be recorded in the inspection activity report and shall be applied thereafter for identification of B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
(c) All B-1B heavy bombers that have been converted prior to the completion of such an exhibition and that have the recorded distinguishing features shall be included in the category of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
2. Upon completion of the conversion of the last B-1B heavy bomber to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, with respect to all such converted B-1B heavy bombers and the eliminated facilities at which they are based, the following procedures shall apply:
(a) The United States of America shall notify the Russian Federation that Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, United States of America, and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, United States of America, have been eliminated when all B-1B heavy bombers based there have been converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
(b) Eliminated facilities where converted B-1B heavy bombers are based may be inspected as formerly declared facilities. Such inspections shall fall within the annual quota for Type Two inspections established in Section VII of Part Five of this Protocol. No more than one such inspection may be conducted each year at either Ellsworth Air Force Base or Dyess Air Force Base.
(c) During the inspection, in order to confirm the distinguishing features of the designated B-1B heavy bombers that indicate that the designated B-1B heavy bomber remains incapable of employing nuclear armaments, the Russian Federation shall use inspection procedures in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol as provided for in Section VII of Part Five of this Protocol, with the following changes:
(i) At the point of entry, which for such an inspection is Travis Air Force Base, California, United States of America, the inspection team that has designated either Ellsworth Air Force Base or Dyess Air Force Base for a formerly declared facility inspection shall be provided information on the number of B-1B heavy bombers located at the base at that time. If less than 50 percent of such heavy bombers based at that base are present, the inspection team leader shall have the right to:
(A) Inform a member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated base shall take place; or
(B) Designate another inspection site associated with the same point of entry; or
(C) Decline to conduct the inspection and leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this event the number of such inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
(ii) Upon the arrival of the inspection team at the formerly declared facility, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with an inspection site diagram of the formerly declared facility annotated to depict the location of each of the B-1B heavy bombers located at the base;
(iii) Upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader shall designate for inspection no more than three B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments;
(iv) The inspection team shall have the right to inspect each of the three designated B-1B heavy bombers to confirm that these heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments; and
(v) The results of such an inspection shall be recorded in the inspection activity report.
3. Upon completion of the conversion of all B-1B heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, such converted heavy
bombers shall not be subject to a Type One inspection when those heavy bombers are present at an air base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented at the base.
4. If either Party decides to convert all heavy bombers of another type that are equipped for nuclear armaments to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, such heavy bombers converted in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol shall also be subject to the aforementioned verification measures.

Second Agreed Statement

U.S. Submarines Equipped with Launchers of Cruise Missiles Converted from Ballistic Missile Submarines The Parties agree that the following provisions shall apply to the U.S. submarines equipped with launchers of cruise missiles converted from ballistic missile submarines, known to the United States of America as “SSGNs” and to the Russian Federation as “PLARK”:
1. In order to provide assurances that all four U.S. SSGNs are incapable of launching SLBMs, the following provisions shall apply with respect to such submarines:
(a) No later than three years after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct an initial one-time exhibition of each of these four SSGNs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to confirm that the launchers on such submarines are incapable of launching SLBMs. Such an exhibition shall be conducted in order to confirm that that an SLBM launcher has been converted, as provided for in Section VIII of Part Five of this Protocol, and, as applicable, in accordance with the procedures for an exhibition specified in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
(b) After completion of the initial exhibitions, the United States of America shall periodically provide an opportunity for the Russian Federation to confirm that none of the launchers on the four SSGNs has been reconverted and each of them remains incapable of launching an SLBM. In order to provide assurances that the launchers on such a submarine have not been reconverted and remain incapable of launching SLBMs,
the Russian Federation shall have the right, while conducting a Type One inspection at a submarine base, to inspect the designated launchers on an SSGN if such a submarine is located at the submarine base. Throughout the duration of the Treaty, the number of such inspections shall not exceed a total of six inspections for all four SSGNs existing at the time of entry into force of the Treaty, and the number of such inspections shall not exceed two inspections for each SSGN. The coastlines and waters diagram of the inspected submarine base, provided during the pre-inspection procedures, shall depict the locations of all ballistic missile submarines and SSGNs located at that time at the submarine base.
(c) An inspection of a launcher on an SSGN shall be conducted in accordance with Part Five of this Protocol and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol for conducting an inspection of an SLBM launcher that does not contain a deployed SLBM, with the following changes:
(i) The SSGNs at the designated submarine base shall be subject to pre-inspection restrictions specified in paragraph 3 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol and shall be subject to inspection. After pre-inspection restrictions were implemented, no temporary shelters shall be installed over the launchers on the SSGN. If temporary shelters were installed before pre-inspection restrictions were implemented, the launchers on an SSGN under these shelters shall not be subject to inspection. The total number of such launchers on a single SSGN that are not subject to inspection because they are undersuch shelters shall not exceed eight launchers;
(ii) Upon arrival of the inspection team at the submarine base, a member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader, in writing, in addition to the information provided for in subparagraph 5(b) of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, information on the number of SSGNs subject to inspection pursuant to this Agreed Statement and on the number of launchers on those submarines;
(iii) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection two launchers on an SSGN, if an SSGN is located at that base, instead of one non-deployed launcher of SLBMs;
(iv) The inspection team shall have the right to inspect the designated launchers on the SSGN in order to confirm that the designated launchers remain incapable of launching SLBMs; and
(v) The results of such an inspection shall be recorded in the inspection activity report.
2. If either Party converts a ballistic missile submarine to a submarine equipped with launchers of cruise missiles, such a submarine shall be subject to the measures specified in this Agreed Statement, and an additional number of inspections shall be agreed within the framework of the BCC.

Third Agreed Statement

Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-nuclear Armaments

The Parties agree that, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right, at an air base, to carry out joint basing of heavy bombers of a type equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers of the same type that have been converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol, until the last heavy bomber of such a type has been converted to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
1. All heavy bombers of a type located at an air base at which joint basing of heavy bombers is carried out shall be subject to inspection until the last heavy bomber of that type equipped for nuclear armaments has been converted to a heavy bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments. In this connection, an inspection of heavy bombers declared during pre-inspection procedures to be equipped for nuclear armaments shall fall within the annual inspection quota for Type One inspections established in Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol. During the same inspection, heavy bombers of the same type declared to be converted heavy bombers may be inspected in order to confirm that they have not been reconverted and remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments.
2. The inspection of an air base at which heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers of the same type converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are jointly based shall be conducted in accordance with Part Five of this Protocol, using the following modified Type One inspection procedures:
(a) If the inspection team has designated for inspection such an air base, a member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader, in addition to the information specified in paragraph 6 of Section IV of Part Five of this Protocol that pertains to deployed heavy bombers of a type, information on the number of heavy bombers of the same type converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments located at that time at that air base;
(b) The heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and the heavy bombers of the same type converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments located at that air base shall be subject to the pre-inspection restrictions specified in paragraph 3 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol;
(c) Upon the arrival of the inspection team at the air base, a member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader, in writing, in addition to the information provided for in subparagraph 5(c) of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, information on the number and type of heavy bombers converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments located at the air base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented. In addition, an inspection site diagram of the air base, depicting the location of all such heavy bombers converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, shall be provided;
(d) Upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader shall designate for inspection no more than three deployed heavy bombers depicted on the inspection site diagram of the air base. The inspection team shall have the right to inspect the designated deployed heavy bombers in order to confirm the number of nuclear armaments located on them;
(e) In addition, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, if so designated, no more than two heavy bombers of the same type converted to heavy bombers equipped for non- nuclear armaments in order to confirm that such heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments; and
(f) The results of such an inspection shall be recorded in the inspection activity report.

Fourth Agreed Statement

Deployed Heavy Bombers Located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base

The Parties agree that U.S. heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments awaiting conversion or elimination may be located at the storage facility for heavy bombers at Davis- Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, United States of America. Each such heavy bomber shall remain based at a declared air base and shall be considered to be a deployed heavy bomber until it is converted or eliminated in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol.
1. In order to provide assurances that deployed heavy bombers located at the storage facility for heavy bombers at Davis- Monthan Air Force Base do not have nuclear armaments located on them, the following provisions shall apply.
2. For the purposes of this Agreed Statement, the term “environmentally-sealed heavy bomber” means a heavy bomber that has undergone the process of comprehensive sealing of an aircraft in a manner that protects it from the effects of dust, humidity, sunlight, and extreme temperatures, which may include the sealing of access panels, doors, plates, and other small openings.
3. In order to confirm that the environmentally-sealed heavy bomber has no nuclear armaments on board, no later than 120 days after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct a one-time exhibition of one environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bomber of each type located at the storage facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. Such an exhibition shall be conducted in accordance with Part Five of this Protocol and the procedures set forth in this paragraph after receipt of the appropriate notifications:
(a) Upon the arrival of the inspection team at the storage facility, a member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader, in writing, information on the number and types of environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bombers located at the storage facility. In addition, an inspection site diagram of the storage facility for heavy bombers, annotated to depict the location of all such heavy bombers, shall be provided.
(b) Upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader shall designate for exhibition no more than one environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bomber of each type depicted on the inspection site diagram of the storage facility for heavy bombers.
(c) Upon the arrival of the inspection team at a designated heavy bomber, the in-country escort shall prepare the heavy bomber for viewing. The inspection team shall have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with each designated heavy bomber while that heavy bomber is being prepared for viewing.
(d) During the exhibition:
(i) The inspection team shall have the right to inspect a designated environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bomber of each type by viewing the interior of the weapons bays of such a heavy bomber from a location designated by the in-country escort, in order to confirm that such a heavy bomber does not have nuclear armaments located on it.
(ii) For all remaining environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bombers declared during pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team shall have the right to view the exterior of each such heavy bomber in order to confirm the comprehensive sealing of the airplane and to read the unique identifier on it.
(iii) Except for heavy bombers designated for further inspection in accordance with subparagraph (i) of this subparagraph, the inspection team shall not have the right to view the interior portions of any other environmentally-sealed heavy bomber.
(e) After the exhibition, the inspection team shall apply, in a manner agreed by the Parties, unique tamper-proof seals to all weapons bays of each environmentally-sealed heavy bomber that has been inspected.
(f) The results of such an exhibition, including unique identifiers of heavy bombers and the locations of unique tamper-proof seals, shall be recorded in the inspection activity report.
4. After the exhibition provided for in paragraph 3 of this Agreed Statement has been conducted, deployed heavy bombers located at the storage facility shall be subject to Type Two inspections in accordance with Section VII of Part Five of this Protocol. Such inspections shall fall within the annual inspection quota for Type Two inspections. During such inspections the following procedures shall apply:
(a) Upon the arrival of the inspection team at the storage facility, a member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader, in writing, information on the number and types of all deployed heavy bombers located at the storage facility, as well as the condition of each such heavy bomber. In addition, an inspection site diagram of the storage facility for heavy bombers, annotated to depict the location of all such heavy bombers, shall be provided.
(b) Upon completion cf the pre-inspection procedures, the
nspection team leader shall designate for inspection no more than three deployed heavy bombers that are not environmentally-sealed and that are depicted on the inspection site diagram of the storage facility for heavy bombers.
(c) The inspection team shall have the right to inspect all deployed heavy bombers located at the storage facility at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented in order to confirm the data on the number and types of these heavy bombers.
(d) Environmentally-sealed heavy bombers may be inspected only by viewing the exterior of such heavy bombers in order to confirm the number and type of such heavy bombers, to read the unique identifiers on them, and to verify that the unique tamper-proof seals have not been damaged. In the event that the unique tamper-proof seals on a heavy bomber have been damaged, the inspected Party shall provide an explanation of the reason for such damage. In the event that the explanation is judged to be unsatisfactory, such a heavy bomber may be inspected by viewing the interior of the weapons bay, and the unique tamper-proof seals may be re-applied to the weapons bay.
(e) Upon the arrival of the inspection team at designated heavy bombers, the in-country escort shall prepare the heavy bombers for viewing. The inspection team shall have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with each designated heavy bomber while the heavy bomber is being prepared for viewing.
(f) For deployed heavy bombers designated for inspection in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect such heavy bombers by viewing the interior of the weapons bays of such heavy bombers from a location designated by the in-country escort, in order to confirm that such heavy bombers do not have nuclear armaments located on them.
(g) Deployed heavy bombers may be inspected only to the extent that the condition of such heavy bombers allows such procedures to be carried out.
5. If an environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bomber of a type subject to the Treaty and not exhibited during the exhibition conducted in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Agreed Statement is located at the storage facility at Davis- Monthan Air Force Base after such an exhibition, the United States of America shall conduct a similar exhibition of one environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bomber of that type. Such an exhibition shall be conducted in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Agreed Statement.

Fifth Agreed Statement

Rapid Reload of ICBM and SLBM Launchers

The Parties agree that the production, testing, or
deployment of systems designed for the rapid reload of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers is unwarranted and should not be pursued by either Party.

Sixth Agreed Statement

Use of Telemetric Information

The Parties agree that the exchange of telemetric information within the framework of the Treaty is designed to help forge a new strategic relationship of the Parties, not for undermining the potential of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.

Seventh Agreed Statement

Converted Silo Launchers of ICBMs at Vandenberg Air Force Base

The Parties agree that, with respect to the five converted silo launchers of ICBMs located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, United States of America, that were converted prior to signature of the Treaty, the following provisions shall apply.
1. In order to provide assurances that all five converted silo launchers of ICBMs remain incapable of launching ICBMs, no later than three years after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct a one-time exhibition of the five converted silo launchers of ICBMs. The purpose of such an exhibition shall be to demonstrate that these launchers are no longer capable of launching ICBMs as well as to determine the features that distinguish a converted silo launcher of ICBMs from a silo launcher of ICBMs that has not been converted. On the basis of the results of such an exhibition, the distinguishing features shall be recorded in the inspection activity report. Such an exhibition shall be conducted, as applicable, in accordance with the procedures for an exhibition specified in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol, as provided for in Section VIII of Part Five of this Protocol.
2. After the initial exhibition of all five converted silo launchers of ICBMs, the United States of America shall conduct one additional exhibition of the five converted silo launchers of ICBMs to demonstrate that the previously recorded distinguishing features remain unchanged, that the launchers have not been reconverted, and that the launchers remain incapable of launching ICBMs. Such an exhibition shall be conducted at an agreed time, but no later than 30 days after the receipt of a request thereof from the Russian Federation.

Eighth Agreed Statement

Non-nuclear Objects Located on the Front Section of an ICBM or SLBM

1. The Parties agree that, considering military utility, only nuclear-armed reentry vehicles and non-nuclear objects other than reentry vehicles may be simultaneously located on a front section of an ICBM or SLBM.
2. Such non-nuclear objects located on the front section of an ICBM or SLBM that has been declared to be equipped with no less than one nuclear-armed reentry vehicle shall not be counted against the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph l(b) of Article I1 of the Treaty.
3. The Parties shall have the right to confirm that such non- nuclear objects are not nuclear-armed reentry vehicles, using procedures contained in the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.

Ninth Agreed Statement

Conversion of Individual Launchers of SLBMs

1. The Parties agree that launchers converted in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol that are incapable of launching SLBMs may simultaneously be located on a ballistic missile submarine.
2. Within the 30-day period after provision of notification of the completion of the conversion of the first launcher of SLBMs installed on a specific type of ballistic missile submarine, the Party that carried out such a conversion shall conduct a one-time exhibition of a converted launcher and an SLBM launcher that has not been converted.
(a) The purpose of such an exhibition shall be to demonstrate the distinguishing features of a converted launcher and an SLBM launcher that has not been converted.
(b) On the basis of the results of the exhibition, the distinguishing features shall be recorded in the inspection activity report and shall be used thereafter for conducting inspections.
3. Upon completion of the conversion procedures in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of Section IV of Part Three of this Protocol, the specified converted launchers shall not be counted against the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph l(c) of Article I1 of the Treaty.
4. Throughout the duration of the Treaty, in order to provide assurances that converted launchers installed on ballistic missile submarines have not been reconverted and remain incapable of launching SLBMs, upon completion of the period of inspection of each launcher provided for in paragraph 7 of Section IV of Part Three of this Protocol, converted launchers shall remain subject to inspection during Type One inspections at submarine bases.
5. The inspection of a converted launcher installed on a ballistic missile submarine shall be conducted in accordance with Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, with the following changes:(a) Upon the arrival of the inspection team at the submarine base, a member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader, in writing, in addition to the information provided for in subparagraph 5(b) of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, information on the number of converted launchers installed on ballistic missile submarines subject to pre-inspection restrictions, including the location of each converted launcher installed on each ballistic missile submarine.
(b) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one converted launcher installed on a ballistic missile submarine in addition to SLBM launchers, the inspection of which is provided for in subparagraph 6(b) of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol.
(c) The designated converted launcher must be installed on the same ballistic missile submarine as the designated deployed launcher of SLBMs.
(dl A subgroup of no more than five inspectors shall have the right to inspect the designated converted launcher to confirm that the converted launcher remains incapable of launching an SLBM, using each of the recorded distinguishing features for such a launcher.
(el The results of such an inspection and confirmation of each of the distinguishing features shall be recorded in the inspection activity report.

Tenth Agreed Statement

Customs Duties and Taxes

The Parties agree that all equipment, recording media, and supporting documentation for such media, as well as tools required for installation, provided by a Party and imported into the territory of the other Party for the purposes of the Treaty, shall be exempt from any customs duties and related taxes and charges.

PART TEN -FINAL PROVISIONS

1. The Parties may agree to additional procedures for the implementation of this Protocol. Such procedures shall be contained in Annexes which shall be an integral part of this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of entryinto force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. I Done at Prague, this eighth day of April, 2010, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both I texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RUSSIAN FEDERATION: