Below are a selection of the reports from a six-year archive of classified military documents published by WikiLeaks. These examples provide an unvarnished, ground-level picture of the war in Afghanistan. Some of the documents suggest that the Pakistani military and its spy agency have been unspoken allies of the Afghan insurgency. Some names and details have been redacted by The Times to conceal suspects’ identities, or because they might put people in danger or reveal key tactical military capabilities.
- Jan. 5, 2009 Working Two Sides
(THREAT REPORT) IED THREAT RPT Sorobi
INS MEET TO PLAN AN SVBIED ATTACK
Organization(s) Involved: FOREIGN FIGHTERS,INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE,OPPOSING MILITANT FORCES
14 JAN 2009, TF CASTLE INTSUM 4311, NSI
(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) AAF MOVE BLUE JINGLE TRUCK VBIED TO SAROBI DISTRICT
ON 5 JANUARY 2009, FROM 2100 TO 2300 HOURS LOCAL TIME, AAF COMMANDERS ((NAZIR)), ((HALLIMULLAH)), ((MALANG)) BASED IN WANA, SOUTH WAZIRISTAN AGENCY (SWA), FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA), PAKISTAN, HELD A MEETING TO DISCUSS THEIR PLANS TO AVENGE THE DEATH OF ZAMARAI. THE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED AT THE RESIDENCE OF ——— ————— IN WANA. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE WERE THREE UNIDENTIFIED OLDER ARAB MALES, WHO WERE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE ARABS WERE BELIEVED TO BE IMPORTANT BECAUSE THEY HAD A LARGE SECURITY CONTINGENT WITH THEM.) AT LEAST ONE OF THE THREE UNIDENTIFIED ARABS IN ATTENDANCE WAS PROFICIENT IN THE PASHTUN LANGUAGE AND THE ARABS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROXIMATELY 20 ARAB BODYGUARDS. ((HAMID GUL)), A FORMER MEMBER OF PAKISTAN’S INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (ISI), WAS IN ATTENDANCE AT THE MEETING ALSO. HAMID GUL WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING AN OLDER MAN AND A VERY IMPORTANT PERSON FROM ISI. (COMMENT: HAMID GUL WAS DIRECTOR GENERAL OF ISI FROM 1987-1989 AND, ACCORDING TO ISI, HAS NOT BEEN AN OFFICIAL WITH ISI SINCE THAT TIME. IT WAS NOT KNOWN WHETHER HAMID GUL WAS ACTING WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT OF ISI, OR WHETHER ANY PORTIONS OF ISI WERE AWARE OF HIS ACTIVITIES.)
THE MEETING ATTENDEES WERE SADDENED BY THE NEWS OF ZAMARAI’S DEATH AND DISCUSSED PLANS TO COMPLETE ZAMARAI’S LAST MISSION BY FACILITATING THE MOVEMENT OF A SUICIDE VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (SVBIED) FROM PAKISTAN TO AFGHANISTAN THROUGH THE KHAN PASS, VARIANT: KHAND PASS. (COMMENT: THE KHAN PASS IS LOCATED IN SWA AND HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY USED BY AAF AND ARAB FORCES IN THE PAST.) THE SVBIED WAS DESCRIBED AS A DARK BLUE MAZDA JINGA TRUCK WITH A GRAYISH WHITE HOOD. AS OF 3 JANUARY, THE SVBIED WAS LOCATED IN AZAM WARSAK, SWA. DURING THE MEETING, THE ATTENDEES FORMULATED THE PLAN TO MOVE THE SVBIED, DRIVEN BY AN UNIDENTIFIED ARAB, ON 10 JANUARY 2009 THROUGH THE KHAN PASS. THE MILITANTS PLANNED TO TARGET SAROBI, AFGHANISTAN, WITH THE SVBIED. (COMMENT: SAROBI IS LIKELY A REFERENCE TO SAROBI DISTRICT, PAKTIKA PROVINCE.) HAMID GUL ENCOURAGED THE AAF LEADERS TO FOCUS THEIR OPERATION INSIDE OF AFGHANISTAN IN EXCHANGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN’S SECURITY FORCES TURNING A BLIND EYE TO THE PRESENCE OF AAF COMMANDERS AND FIGHTERS IN PAKISTAN (NFI). ADDITIONALLY, THE AAF LEADERS APPROVED A PLAN TO SEND 50 ARAB AND 50 WAZIRI FIGHTERS TO GHAZNI PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN IN EARLY FEBRUARY 2009. ACCORDING TO HAMID GUL, THE AERIAL THREATS IN THE AREA WERE CONTROLLED FROM THE AIRPORT IN WANA.
- Dec. 18, 2006 Suicide Training
(THREAT REPORT) IED THREAT RPT Kabul
POSSIBLE IED ATTACKS IN KABUL
24 DEC 2006, ISAF CJ2X INTSUM 06100, NIS
(—— —) RC CAPITAL – Possible suicide attack in KABUL. (C?3)
DOI: 18 Dec 06; OHR: RO FHT/1929.
(—— —) A network of both Afghani and Pakistani terrorists has been planning and executing suicide attacks in KABUL City starting with unknown date. They are carrying out these sorts of operations in present. The entire process runs cyclically.
The process includes: training of suicide attackers, reconnaissance of operation area, operation planning, transport and hosting of suicide attackers and the execution of the attacks.
Generally responsible (but in an unknown manner) for suicide operations in KABUL City is ——— ——— —— — ——— ———— ——— ————— ———— / PAKISTAN. He is an ISI member in ———— — ——— (Intelligence Service —————) office in ————— and part of his job is ————— ————— —————. (OPR COMMENT: Source was unable to further specify this job function. ENDS.) He graduated DAR AL ULOM-E HAQQANIA (religious school) having ————— ——— —— as one of his teachers.
Training: The suicide attackers are trained in GHALANI CAMP MOHMAND GHAR and MAULANA Jalaluddin HAQQANI’S camp located in northern WALERISTAN.
Reconnaissance, planning and transportation: Responsible for reconnaissance of the area, planning and transporting the suicide attackers from PAKISTAN to AFGHANISTAN is ——— ——— ——— —— — ——— ————. First, before bringing the attackers, ——— ——— ——— travelled to KABUL in order to check the local situation and to get specific information from ——— and ———, two police officers working in ————— branch of KABUL City Police. After getting the necessary information, he returned to PAKISTAN and started making plans supervised by AL ZAWAHIRI, ——— ———— ———— and ————— ————— ——— —————. ——— ——— ——— —— ——— — ————— Village ———— —— ————— ——— ——— ————— ———— ————— but presently he lives in ————— ——— ———— —————.
Hosting: At the completion of the planning process, ——— ——— ——— started bringing the suicide attackers to KABUL and delivering them to ——— locals. These ——— are: ————— — —— ———— ——— ——— —— ——— ——— —— ——— ——— ——— ——— ————— ——— ——— —— ——— are involved in weapons and drug smuggling. They have links with PD— police and PD — and PD — NDS and Anti-terrorism Department of MOI. These ——— people harbour the suicide attackers inside their houses.
Execution: After arriving to KABUL, the suicide attackers reconnoitred the area in order to find a suitable place for their attacks. Once a suitable place is found the attackers perform their attacks.
This information MUST NOT be disseminated to the GoA.
- Dec. 20, 2006 Festival of Sacrifices
(THREAT REPORT) IED THREAT RPT Kabul
PLANNED ATTACKS AGAINST NATO
Organization(s) Involved: HEZB E ISLAMI GULBUDDIN
23 DEC 2006, —————-——-—/— —
It is reported that; ————— ——— (loyal to HIG and Kashmir KHAN, NFI) took the delivery of one suicide attacker from “Madrasa of Hashimiye” which is a training school for suicide attackers and located in Peshawer district of Pakistan, by the orders of Kashmir KHAN (HIG Commander) and Abu IHLAS (AQ Commander). After that, ——— went to Jalalabad district of NANGARHAR with the suicide attacker and bought a car to prepare it as a SVBIED. SVBIED is a Toyota Corolla SW, in light yellow color, 1996 model, and its license plate number is Jalalabad ———.
After preparing the Toyota Corolla as a SVBIED, they intruded into Pol-e Charki region of KABUL on the night of 20 Dec 2006. The name of the suicide attacker is ——— ———. He is 22-24 years old and one of the Pashtuns of Pakistan.
He is planning to conduct SVBIED attack against US and ISAF/NATO vehicles on Route White and Route Violet in KABUL until the Muslim Festival of Sacrifices (between 31 Dec 06 and 03 Jan 07). (NFDK).
CTC Comment: 95% of the suicide attackers are trained in the “Madrasa of Hashimiye” which is located in Peshawer district of Pakistan. Monthly, the former Chief of ISI – General Hamid GUL is visiting this madrasa.
FHT Comment: NIL.
1. This report is in response to RCC PIR 1A.
2. CTC re-contactable.
There are some reasons to consider this info as a real threat warning:
- info is covering the essential ———:
- the mentioned timing of the attack – Muslim Festival of Sacrifice make us think the threat is more likely;
- insurgent’s plan could be to take advantage of season’s feast IOT obtain a magnified media impact.
- July 1, 2008 Embassy Attack
(THREAT REPORT) ATTACK THREAT RPT Kabul
TB THREAT TO INDIAN EMBASSY
Organization(s) Involved: TALIBAN CENTER
01 JUL 2008, ———— —— ———— ———— ————— ——
FROM: ———— ——
TO: ISAF HQ CJ2 CJOC REP
SOURCE: —— —— ——— ————
DATE OF INFORMATION: 30JUN08
DATE OF REPORT: 01JUL08
NUMBER OF REPORT: 75010708
TOPIC: Security situation in KABUL
Taliban are planning to carry out an attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul. TB designated an engineer ———— ————— ————— to take this action. He intends to use stolen ANA/ANP car, and wears stolen uniform. He speaks Dari with distinct Iranian accent. Allegedly, he is the owner of a ————— company.
INS are planning to divide into two groups: first will attack Indian embassy building, whilst the second group will engage security posts in front of MOI, IOT give possibility to escape attackers from the first group.
Budget for this action is about 120 000 USD. The main goal of this operation is to show TB’s abilities to carry out attack on every object in Kabul /IO/. /NFI/
- Oct. 3, 2009 Fighters Breach Outpost Keating
(ENEMY ACTION) DIRECT FIRE RPT (HMG,Small Arms,RPG) TF DESTROYER : 8 CF KIA 23 CF WIA 1 HNSF KIA 9 HNSF WIA 2 UE KIA
Tier Level 1
***** SALTUR FOLLOWS *****
ACTIVITY: B-10 SAF
L:F: YE: 1143 2254 KEATING L:E:YE 104 225
UNIT: B TROOP 3-61 CAV
RESPONSE: RETURNING WITH 120MM AND SAF
***** END REPORT *****
WHY: Conducting Normal COP and OP operations
[01:33] < BlackKnight_TOC > FRI AND KEA IN HEAVY CONTACT
[01:33] < BlackKnight_TOC > Requesting Air Tic Be opened
01:32] < Keating2OPS > we need it now we have mortars pinned down and fire coming form everywhere
01:33] < Keating2OPS > fritsche is taking heavy machine gun fire as well
[01:33] < BlackKnight_TOC > wee need something
[01:37] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > [01:33] < BlackKnight_TOC > fri and kea still taking heavy contact
[01:33] < BlackKnight_TOC > fri and kea still taking heavy contact
[01:40] < Keating2OPS > we are taking contact from diving board, switchbacks, putting green and b-10 position
[01:40] < Keating2OPS > we are taking heavy saf and rpgs
[01:40] < Keating2OPS > rpgs from the north face
[01:35] < BlackKnight_TOC > still taking IDF
[01:35] < BlackKnight_TOC > need something our mortors cant get upo
[01:35] < BlackKnight_TOC > we are taking casiltys
[01:35] < BlackKnight_TOC > GET SOMETHING UP!
[——]< TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > BK DUDE 25 enroute No eta yet
[——] < TF_PALEHORSE_BTL_CPT > NEGATIVE, AH ARE BEING ALERTED TIME NOW
TF_PALEHORSE_BTL_CPT > ITS A 40 MINUTE FLIGHT
[——] < Keating2OPS > whats the status of air
[——] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > CAS 5 minutes
[——] < Keating2OPS > we are taking fire from inside urmul village
[01:48] < Keating2OPS > our mortars are still pinned down unable to fire
[01:50] < Keating2OPS > we need cas
[01:50] < Keating2OPS > still taking heavy rpgs and machine gun fire
[01:51] < Keating2OPS > at both locations fritsche and keating taking heavy contact
[01:52] < Keating2OPS > the switchbacks from urmul the diving board and north face
[01:52] < Keating2OPS > at keating and fritsche is surrounded as wel
[01:53] < Keating2OPS > multiple enemies running through the anp station and fire coming from the mosque in urmu
[01:54] < Keating2OPS > priority is switchback and putting green
[01:54] < Keating2OPS > asg is attacking op fritsche att
[——] < Keating2OPS > we are still taking effective rpgs at keating from the anp station everyone at the police station is shooting at us
[——] < Keating2OPS > asg has given up there op at fritsche enemy is 50 meters from the wiere on the high ground
[——] < Keating2OPS > asg has given up there op at fritsche enemy is 50 meters from the wiere
[——] < BlackKnight_TOC > we just lost sac com is we lose mirc we are blacked out!!!
[——] < Keating2OPS > jsut took another casualty
[——] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_NCO > right now
[——] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > What type of injury
[——] < Voodoo_7 > need injury type when possible
[——] < Keating2OPS > they are taking them to the aid station and we will get the updatesd
[——] < TF_PH_RTO > KAMDESH TIC RESPONSE ————— ————— W/U JAF ——
[——] < DestroyerS2OPS > Be advised that Keating and Fritsche are in heavy contact att, previous reporting stated that AAF were planning major coordinated attacks agains Keating, Lowell, and possibly Mace IOT allow FOM of fighters moving on Barge Matal
[——] DUDE 25/26 on station darkknight 34 sending 9 line for bomb drop
[——] < TF_PH_RTO > MM(E)10-03A FL08(070) DO25(944) W/U JAF ——
[——] < Keating2OPS > thats the biggest spot right now ANP Station
[——] < Keating2OPS > they are locked onto the trucks with rpgs
[02:11] < Keating2OPS > op fritsche is about to pop claymores at op fritsche
[02:11] < Keating2OPS > they are that close to the wire
[02:12] < Keating2OPS > we still cant get cas up on cag
[02:14] < Keating2OPS > thats up at fritsche and they are almost in the wire there i dont think they are monitoring that but jam freq ———— —— — —— ———— ——
[02:15] < Keating2OPS > our mortars are still pinned down
[02:16] < OP_MACE > AAF ACTIVLEY TALKING ABOUT BREECHING WIRE FREQ ————— —— —— ——
[02:18] < Keating2OPS > we need aaf is attemtping to breech ana side of keating
[02:19] < Keating2OPS > aaf took one of the ana
[02:19] < Keating2OPS > according to the ana commander
0218z Fritsche is 100% equipment and personel
[02:19] < Keating2OPS > enemy in the wire at keating
[02:20] < BlackKnight_TOC > ENEMUY IN THE WIRE ENEMY IN THE WIRE!!!
[02:21] < Keating2OPS > how long until cca
[02:21] < Keating2OPS > we need support
[02:22] < Keating2OPS > we have enemy on the cop
0223z Enemy in the wire at COP keating they breached from the ANA side of the COP to the West
—— Dude Dropping 2X GBU 38
—— Lost Blackknight on MIRC.
TACSAT only means of communication
—— COP Keating is at thier last fighting postion they are getting over ran and need cas as much as possible.
—— Fritsche reports they are shooting 120MM mortors at COP Keating they are no longer taking contact from the south they are supporting keatings last battle position
[——] < Mace_LLVI > Gist: Keep in contact with your guys up there. I cant reach them from down here. There are 3 injured and one killed.
[——] < Mace_LLVI > OP Comments:
—— destroyer main puts all COPS OP”S and FOB at 100% Force pro defensive positions
—— Blackknight Xray wants to engage everything from West ECP to thier TOC
—— blackknight Xray reports that anything outside the wire is hostile and needs to be engaged
—— there is another Weapons team and medevac bird enroute from BAF will be waiting when birds go to FARP they will take off to provide overwatch
[——] < TF_PH_RTO > KAMDESH TIC RESPONSE WN20(221) WN16(194) ON STATION KEA/FRI AT ——
—— OP Fritsche is no longer taking contact from south they are monitoring the souith and getting Javalins out
—— SITREP from Blackknight 7.
2 US KIA, 1 US WIA URGENT, 6 ANA WIA at COP KEATING >
[——] < Destroyer_EWO > EWO on station jamming ICOMs in Keating ———— — ————— and anything else active
—— AH 64s are giving dismounts cover to get to the Mortor PIT to get thier Guns operational.
—— OP Fritsche reports that they have an RPG stuck in a hesco that didnt explode request that EOD is informed for when they do The retrograde
—— reporting sitrep on Casualties is 2 US KIA 3 US WIA 6x ANA WIA at COP KEATING.
— —— at OP FRITSCHE
——: COP Keating recieving SAF RPG, HAF from Mosque at YE 1121 2248.
——: DUDE drops 2 x GBU 38 on grid YE 1134 2217.
0332z: OP Fritsche reports negative contact. Support COP Keating with mortars.
0336 Red 1 rpts the OMLT and ANA are working to clear ANA compoound. Are working on taking the maint building. Believe that is last postions of aaf within keating
——: AWT W/D BOSTICK FOR FARP.
—— OP FRI rpts sporadic fire returning saf and still spting Keating with 120mm
——: AWT FARP COMPLETE, W/U BOSTICK ANROUTE TO KEATING.
—— OP FRI rpts neg contact att still spting KEA with 120mm
—— OP FRI rpts saf from south att returning with .50 cal
——: OP FRI Reports neg contact ATT.
0419z Keating rpts ANA compound a total loss, burnedt to ground. Unable to retake att. AWT is clearing outer perimieter. Still have no contact with security towers, working on retaking cop.
0427 Keating rpts one AWT was hit by safire and is turning to Bostick, WN 13 —— —— ————— to Keating to replace other wn
0432z Keating rpts more WIA coming in at least 12 more from minor shrapnel
0440 OP FRI rpts all wounded at FRi are superficial and do not require medevac att. all minor grazing wounds.
0520 Keating rpts have retaken another bldg, cant’ push any further due to lack of manpower.
0541 Keating rpts heavy effective fire from the village outside cop vic grid YE 11197 22430.
0554z Keting rpts 2 add heros and one more wia with gsw to chest,
0556z RR rpts icom traffic of aaf wanting to overrun keating. working with cas to drop on aaf positions
0559 Bostick has recieved intel that aaf will try to hit hlz woth all the a/c
0602 upadate to KIA only 3 Heros att
0618 Keating still taking fire and working with cas on aaf postions.
—— also getting llvi traffic on mtr attack for bostick,
0638 FRI neg contact att, keating is taking sporadic fire att, cf is reconsolidating have 5 total heros att, with about 8 WIA
—— Keating rpts neg reinforcing postions, COP still split att. QRF is w/u att to ftitsche
—— ICOM traffic states aaf are adjusting idf on bostick, 1 rnd impacted 300 m west of FOB.
—— W/U qrf bos to fri
—— QRF w/d fri
—— l/u wiht chosin
—— w/d bos
—— w/u bos
—— Keating rpts trying to secure cop with cas and wpns. mvmnt dificult, every move draws enemy fire.
—— Keating rpts more sporadic contact still trying to get acc of all personnel
—— Keating rpts locating one more missing US, Hero att.
0839 BK 6 rpts that most of the contacts are between fri and keating. Working bomb drops along route for movmnt to Keating. AWT rpted DSHKA site vic grid YE 1185 2178, working with Bone to drop on site.
[——] 6 X GBU 38 YE 11850 21780 ONE AT THAT GRID THE OTHER 5 WERE DROP WITHIN A HUNDRED METERS IN A CIRCULAR FORMATION AROUND THAT GRID. @ 1325L
—— Keating rpts sporadic saf from south. working with bone to drop on susp aaf pos.
—— Bone Winchestered and is rtb, dropped on swithbacks. Currently working with Hawg to suppress positions north of Keating
—— BK reports TOC is on fire and moving to alt cp
—— qrf lift 3 w/u turn 1
—— qrf w/d fri
—— qrf w/d b bost
—— BK6 (— pax)w/ qrf flt YE 112 215
1033 Keating rpts still taking sporadic fire, only one building left that is not on fire. Have consolidated all casualties at that location.
—— qrf lift 2 w/u bos to fri
—— qrf lift 2 w/d fri
—— qrf w/u fri
—— qrf w/d bos
—— flt for bk6 ye 116 217
—— Keating rpts neg contact att. Holding in last remaing bldg. Bk 6 is still moving in from the south att flt YE 116 218
—— qrf w/u bostic to fri
1145 keating rpts recieving b-10 fire from vic ye 1257 2184, moving sijan to look in that area, also the urgent cas is deteriating
—— qrf w/d fri
1158 flt for bk6 ye 114 218
1200 Combat 16 flt ye 118 215 had an rpg shot at them landed 200m from them continueing msn
1227 BK 6 in contact at vic grid ye 113 219 near ambush, saf and rpg, bk 6 rpts 2 EKIA att, no friendly cas
1231 FLT for Combat 16 YE 1157 2182
1236 Keating rpts neg contact , still holding alt cp not in danger of burning att, cas are holding up
1309 FLT BK642SYE 11200 21900 and FLT for C16 42SYE 11300 21900
1344 flt for bk6 and c16 is ye 113 222
1404 BK6 is continueing down mnt, has eyes on keating and is has fm coms with elements on keating. BK7 is still consolidating pos waiting on relief ptl
1408 BK6 is in a SBF ye 114 224 near keating while C16 is moving down att. workign in a bounding overwatch mvmnt.
1432z BK6 and C16have reached btm of mtn and are entering keating from the south att.
1452 BK6 is in keating and conducting clearing ops att, nothing to rpt att
0532 keating rpts founding lost US, is hero. Loading critical casualties att.
—— DustOff is W/D at Keating HLZ loading the 3 litre Patients
—— Dustoff w/u Enroute to Bostick
—— Dustoff is w/d at FOB Bostick with patients
[15:54] < BOS_HLZ_OIC > DESTROYER 6 MOVE AND MEDEVAC EXFIL FL08(07z0) FL77(069) W/U BOS ——
[——] < TF_PH_RTO > KEA AREA SECURITY WN14(185) WN15(191) W/U JAF ——
—— LZ security is set walking wounded are making thier way out to the HLZ
—— UH 60s are w/d at keating downloading pax and picking up WIA
—— Birds W/U keating enroute to FOB Bostick With 6 WIA
—— 2nd UH 60 W/D keating uploading Pax WIA and KIA
[16:19] < #TF_MTN_WARRIOR_MEDEVAC > 0 TF_MTN_WARRIOR_MEDOPS : tf mtn wr approves F msn. ROF: —————
—— 2nd UH 60 W/U enroute to bostick with hero’s still have 5 ANA wounded to move
—— Medevac Exfill inbound 3 HEROS and WIA
—— FL 77 w/d keating picking up hero’s need another turn to keating
—— w/u Keating with 4 heros
—— dustoff 23 w/u patient transfer
—— FL 74 W/U Bostick to keating with Speedballs backhaul 5 ANA Walking wounded
—— FL 74 W/D Keating picking up 5 ana walking wounded and dropping off speedballs
—— FL 74 w/u with 5 ana walking wounded and 1 Hero not sure if he is US or ANA
—— FL 74 W/D Bostick with 5 ANA W/W and 1 Hero
[18:06] < ABAD_TOC > MM(E)10-03F DO23(928) PH45(001) PH47(561) transitioning north att
—— BT52(706) AND BT53(010) W/U JAF ISO TF DESTROYER
—— OD44(181) AND OD45(193) W/U JAF ISO TF DESTROYER
—— DESTROYER PAX MOVEMENT FX50(025) FX65(704) OD45(193) W/U JAF ——
—— DESTROYER PAX MOVEMENT BT52(706) BT53(010) OD44(181) W/D BOS ——
——: DESTROYER PAX MOVEMENT FX50(025) FX65(704) OD45(193) W/D BOSTICK ——
[——] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > PAX COUNT BT —— — PAX/ BT —— —PAX/ FX — —PAX/ FX — — PAX W/U enroute to OP Fritsche.
[——] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > FX50(025) FX65(704) —— OP Fritsche —— ——
[——] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > DESTROYER PAX MOVEMENT BT52(706) BT53(010) W/D OP Fritsche
DESTROYER PAX MOVEMENT BT52(706) BT53(010) W/D OP Fritsche ——
[——] < BOS_HLZ_OIC > BT52(706) BT53(010) W/U BOS —— RTB W/ HEROS
[——] < BOS_HLZ_OIC > FX50/65 W//U BOS —— RTB with 1xANA HERO.
[——] < BOS_HLZ_OIC > FL77 W/U BOS —— TO KEA
[——] < TF_LIFT_BFT > DESTROYER PAX MOVEMENT BT52(706) BT53(010) OD44(181) W/D BAF MC
[——] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > FL 77 dropping sling COP Keating
[——] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > OD 44/45 FL 77 W/D Bostick
—— OD 44/45 W/U enroute to OP Fritsche
03:05] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > OD 44/45 Off station OP Fritsche trans South att
[03:06] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > Commandos started movement from OP Fritsche
[03:10] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > ANA/ASG moving 350m East of COP Keating
0542 had two medevacs for WIA from yesterday, 2 ASG, from keating, and on ANA from fri. Neg contact att
0601 ANA/ASG ptl is back at keating att, neg contact continueing to observe
0818 During the ANA ptl they recovered the two ASG WIA as well as two additional ANA KIA, have id numbers and passing to OMLT at bostick att
1021 Knight xray rpts neg contact, holding defensive postions around Keating while prepping for backhaul, RR is rpting icom traffic that the aaf are possibly prepping for another attack this afternoon. Info passed to Keating
S: 5-10 AAF
L: F: 42S YE 11632 21011
E: YE 12083 20307
WHY OP OPs
1030 Guns Hot FRI
1031 FRI rpts contact with DSHKA from the south
!!!!! FIRE MISSION!!!!!
FU LOC: 120mm / YE 118 209 / OP FRITSCHIE
OBS LOC: RED 1F
TGT LOC: KE 4572
MAX ORD: 15000 FT MSL
GTL AZ: 2120 MILS 120 DEG
TOF: 32 SEC
CAN DROP: N/A
MISSION TYPE:IMM SUP
TGT DESC: TIC
!!!!! FIRE MISSION!!!!!
1033 fri rpts contact with mtrs and rpg. working with jtac at keating for bomb drop.
1035 fri rpts all friendlies in the wire att
—— FRi rpts neg contact att, working with dude to drop on dshka
1101 FRI obs pax moving north and south of op, neg PID att, working with DUDE to observe
1110 Recieved LLVI traffic from OP Mace states the aaf intent to take keating. Have passed intel to FRI and KEA att.
1129 FRI rpts neg contact att. continuing to obsv.
1151 FRI rpts neg contact. CCA engaging historical POO sites att.
1153 FRI rpts CCA recieved saf, A10′s conducting gun runs att.
1230 FRI rpts neg enemy contact att, still working with cas att
1302: COP KEATING Reports SAF VIC the YE 109 224. Returning with mortars and direct fire.
1320: Cop Keating Reports NEG enemy contact ATT. Continuing to observe.
[——] < TF_DESTROYER_BTL_CPT > NQRF PRE-POSITION AT BOS: WN13(191) WN16(194) W/D JAF ——
********05 OCT 09 *********
0428 Keating rpts neg enemy contact. Exfilled 16 ANA and one OMLT to JAF last night as well as 2 ANA KIA.
0625 Keating rpts neg contact att. FRI rpts village elders from Kamdish are going to move down to KEA to collect the two ASG Heros. Have passed info ot Kea and coordinating instructions for the approach of village elders.
0915 Destroyer 6 rpts ned contact att. Had local security ptl to Urmul to clear village. Located several AAF KIA but no wpns. AAF collected wpns and exfilled.
1239 Keating rpts neg contact att. Still prepping for exfill,
1354 kEATING RPTS NEG CONTACT ATT, conducting calibration msn with 155 in prep for exfil
******06 OCT 09**********
0439z Keating rpts neg contact att. Had 9LN and 9ASG eveacuated last night from Keating. Commo pck was dropped at keating and FRI to further supplement the COP and OP. As rpted by D6 they will try and start the demo of three 1151s in prep for exfil.
0726 FRI rpts Commandos will conduct ptls to the north and south to clear historical aaf pos. Also, compiling acurate list of WIA, Keating rpts they have 14 WIA with superficial wounds due to the attack on 2 OCT. List has been passed to D7 and S-1 for formal notification of families
0901z FRI rpts commandos found 2 EKIA vic YE 1134 ————— during ptling probably same aaf engaged by BK 6 during intial QRF push from FRI. Also have eyes on 8 pax vic grid YE 09087 20233 as well as DUDE rpting pos aaf vic grid YE 08710 19988. Working with DUDE and FRI mtrs to possibly engage.
1830: OP FRI Reports that one of the earlier Commando patrols Reported finding a small cache at grid YE 11832 21555. containing US CLASS I.
07 OCT 09
0328 Keating backhaul and closure complete, with demo accomplished with CAS. All Soldiers accounted for at Bostick att. AH 10,13,14 remain at FRI and conduct security operations ISO of FRI.
0630Z event closed. It is now listed as a child of OP Mountain Descent
Complex attack on COP Keating and OP Fritsche with HAF, SAF, IDF, RPG.
8x US KIA
23x US WIA
3x ANA KIA
10 x ANA WIA
2 x ASG
1X US SOLDIER was deemed non injured is at FOB Bostick 5X US WIA superficial wounds at OP Fritche does not need IMMEDIATE MEDEVAC ATT.
11 x GBU 31
26 x GBU 38
1 x Hellfire
3 x 20mm strafing runs.
19x 105 (AC-130)
- Feb. 17, 2008 Threatening Calls
(THREAT REPORT) OTHER RPT Qalat
ANA MAJOR THREATENED BY TB
Organization(s) Involved: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY,TALIBAN SOUTH
19 FEB 2008, TFZ INTSUM 568, GCTF
(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) ANA BDE CDR is Threatened by TB: On 17FEB2008 at 2240L, the 205th ANA BDE Commander MG Jamaladin received a call from Taliban Commander Mullah Ezat. Mullah Ezat told the ANA CDR to surrender and offered him $100,000(US) to quit working for the Afghan Army. Ezat also stated that he knows where the ANA CDR is from and knows his family. The BDE CDR called the number that Mullah Ezat had called from but there was no answer (Source Comment- this phone call has instilled fear into the new ANA BDE commander and made him much more cautious. It is unlikely that the TB will follow through with their threats; they are likely testing the new CDR).
- May 9, 2009 Recruiting Civilians
(THREAT REPORT) ATTACK THREAT RPT Gehazi Abad
MULLAH JUMA KHANS ACTIVITY IN GHAZIABAD
Organization(s) Involved: OPPOSING MILITANT FORCES
09 MAY 2009, TF DUKE INTSUM 285, NSIGCTF
(S//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO) Insurgent Leader Mullah Juma Khan Went To The House Of ——— ———— In ———, Ghaziabad District, To Pay Respects To A Dead Insurgent Fighter. Mullah Juma Khan Spoke About Current Events In Helgal Valley, Ghaziabad District And Recruited People At The Memorial To Become Insurgent Fighters (08MAY09). On 05 May 2009, Mullah ((Juma)) Khan went to the house of ——— ————— //——— —————// in ——— //——— —————//, Ghaziabad District, Konar Province, Afghanistan. (Field Comment-For more information and overhead imagery of ——— ————— house refer to —— — —— ——— — dated 28 December 2008.) Juma traveled to ———, Ghaziabad District from Helgal //MGRS: 42SYD112962//, Ghaziabad District. Juma made this visit to pay respects for a dead insurgent fighter. The dead insurgent was ————— ———. On 03 May 2009, ——— was killed by a mortar during the attack against the Tsunel Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) East Observation Post (OP), Ghaziabad District. (Field Comment-For more information on this attack REFER to Task Force (TF) Raider INTSUM 291 dated 03 May 2009.) ——— was skilled with using mortar tubes and rocket propelled grenade launchers. Juma brought with him 40 insurgent fighters carrying weapons. The weapons included three //Zekuwak// heavy machine guns, one DSHK heavy machine gun and one mortar tube. (Comment-The weapons were bundled in blankets to make backpacks. Juma said this is what was in them.) The fighting group traveled with Juma to prevent themselves and their weapons from being destroyed or captured by Coalition Forces (CF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) operating in Helgal Valley, Ghaziabad District. (Field Comment-Helgal Valley is the valley from Abragal //——— —————//, Ghaziabad District to Helgal, Ghaziabad District.) Also present at ————— House was ——— ———— and 40 other unknown guests from the Gojer Tribe to pay respect to ———. Juma gave a speech to motivate the people to continue fighting against CF and ANSF.
(S//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO) Juma first promised he will give orders to the village elders of Helgal, Ghaziabad District to release the prisoners to CF. (Field Comment-Report is referring to the prisoners taken in the 01 May 2009 attack on OP Bari Alai. For more information refer to TF Raider INTSUM 289 dated 01 May 2009.) The residents of Helgal Valley, Ghaziabad District asked Juma to have the prisoners released so CF would stop hunting for the prisoners in Helgal Valley. From 01 May 2009 to 05 May 2009, more than 30 residents of Helgal Valley, Ghaziabad District were killed. According to Juma those killed included insurgent leaders Hajji ((Said)), Hajji ((Daim)) and Hajji ((Khwashah)). (Comment-The Taliban are trying to keep the actual number quiet. There was a lot of new unmarked graves in Helgal when I traveled through there.) Juma cried while telling the people an unnamed woman and her baby were killed while the woman was nursing the baby. (Comment-He did not say exactly how, when or where.) Juma then told the people they needed to be angry at CF and ANSF for causing this tragedy.
(S//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO) Juma plans to destroy the Tsunel VPB. Juma invited everyone who wants to fight to join the fighters who traveled with him. On the evening of 05 May 2009, ——— ———— planned to lead these fighters to ——— //——— —————//, Ghaziabad District. Juma stated he is in communication with the insurgent leaders in ———— //——— —————//, Ghaziabad District; Arzigal //——— —————//, Naray District, Konar Province; and —— //——— —————//, Naray District. Juma and the other insurgent leaders are planning an attack against the Tsunel VPB from the north and south sides of the Konar River, Ghaziabad District. (Comment-He did not talk about the exact plan or when the fight will occur.) On 05 May 2009, 25 members of the Gojer Tribe present at the memorial decided to fight with ———— and agreed to travel with him.
(S//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO) There is one fighter named (—————) in ———— who keeps trying to attack the ———— VPB East OP by himself. On 04 May 2009, the unnamed brother of ——— was killed while trying to recover their unnamed cousins body from the mountain the ———— VPB East OP, Ghaziabad District is built on. (Comment-Someone at the memorial said he activated a mine.) On 03 May 2009, the unnamed cousin was killed during the attack on the ———— VPB East OP, Ghaziabad District. Juma said not to be like ——— who will be killed without getting his revenge because he fights by himself. (Comment-He meant he was the Taliban leader in Ghaziabad District and not to fight without his order.) ——— has a FPK rifle. The other remaining fighters from previous attacks against ———— VPB East OP, Ghaziabad District are in ———, Ghaziabad District taking shelter in the forrest waiting for orders.
- March 6, 2008 Kidnapping and Murder
TF 3 Fury reports Zurmat LN kidnappings and execution
On or about 06 MAR 08, INS kidnapped ——— ————— and his Nephew ————— from their home in Tutakhel, Zormat District. On the night of 08 MAR 08, ——— ————— was killed. ——— was blindfolded and he was shot in the chest approximately 16 times with an AK-47. The body along with AK-47 shells were dumped in the village of Chawni to make it look like ——— was executed there. ANP assessed that the execution did not take place in Chawni because they interviewed all the personnel living in the area where the body was dumped and no one claimed to hear any gunfire. ———’s nephew ————— is still being held hostage by insurgents. No new information exists to —————’s whereabouts and no ransom has been demanded by INS. ——— and ————— were reportedly kidnapped because ———’s older brother, ——— —————, is an AUP patrolman.NFTR.
- Nov. 20, 2006 Suicide Truck Bombs
(THREAT REPORT) IED THREAT RPT Kabul
TB TO USE ANA TRUCKS AS SVBIEDS
Organization(s) Involved: TALIBAN
20061210-CJ2X INTSUM -(N/I C)
RC CAPITAL – TALIBAN captured Four ANA trucks to be used as SVBIEDs in KABUL City, KABUL Province. (B?2)
DOI: 20 Nov 06; OHR: CIINTREP-ADET-IX-480-06
(N/I C) 1. The TALIBAN has transported four captured ANA pick-up trucks to KABUL District, KABUL Province for use as SVBIEDs. They intend to use the pick-up trucks to target ANA compounds, ISAF and GOA convoys, as well as high-ranking GOA and ISAF officials. The four pick-up trucks are described as standard sand-coloured ANA FORD RANGER pick-up trucks; license plates are unknown. The four trucks were also accompanied by an unknown quantity of ANA uniforms to facilitate carrying out the attacks.
2. The four trucks were captured during an attack on an ANA convoy in SHAJOY District (GRID NOT AVAILABLE), ZABUL Province. The attack took place sometime during the week of 20 to 26 Nov 06, resulting in the deaths of two TALIBAN fighters. However, the remaining TALIBAN elements were able to capture a total of six ANA FORD RANGERs and some uniforms prior to fleeing. Four of the pick-ups were sent to KABUL District while the remaining two were sent to PARWAN, KAPISA, or GHAZNI Province, no further information.
3. The Afghan Ministry of Defence (MOD) is aware of the vehicles capture and plate numbers. However, they are keeping all information related to the six vehicles quiet, while MOD and Afghan National Police (ANP) search for them. The four pick-ups supposedly entered KABUL District. This is not yet confirmed; however, the MOD and ANP are aggressively searching for them in KABUL City area.
4. In addition, on approximately 28 Nov 06, ANP forces seized 20 BM-1 rockets in the MOSAHI District (GRID NOT AVAILABLE), KABUL Province. The 20 rockets were set up and positioned to be fired at KABUL City; however, no one was found in the area, NFI. The area in which the rockets were found has been used in the past by HIG Commander DERVISH to conduct rocket attacks on KABUL City. It is possible that these rockets belonged to DERVISH, but this has not been confirmed.
This information MUST NOT be disseminated to AFG authorities.
- March 17, 2007 Attacks on Afghan Drivers
D4 170855Z SAF AND RPG ATK ON LN TRUCKS VIC KAMU COMBAT OUTPOST (mod)
170855Z LN trucks leaving the Kamu Combat Outpost (heading East, returning to Naray after delivering CL I supplies) were ambushed by an enemy element at an illegal check point (being reported by the LN truck drivers as approximately 50x enemy pax), approximately 1km east of the Kamu Combat Outpost. Once the LN vehicles were disabled, the LN drivers were attacked individually by the enemy pax (2 of the driver’s ears were cut off, and 1x driver had shrapnel in his thigh from the initial attack). TF Titan sent a US/ANA QRF element to the location of the attack, and received SAF as they were approaching the ambush site. TF Titan returned SAF, and CAS and CCA were diverted to support. The enemy broke contact, and TF Titan moved to the LN trucks and their drivers. The 3x LN wounded walked themselves to the Kamu Outpost, and TF Titan continued to provide medical assistance. At 1130Z TF Titan updates there is a suspicious compound near the ambush site, with 3x pax in BDU uniforms around the compound. One of the LN drivers that was wounded indicated the men who attacked them were located at the same suspicious compound prior to the attack, and were also wearing BDUs. TF Titan did not take any action on the compound at this time, but have taken 6x road workers back to the Kamu Combat outpost who were witnesses to the attack. All elements are RTB at the kamu COP, and TF Titan is continuing to develop a COA to remove the 3x trucks that were attacked (and are currently burning and blocking the road). NFTR ATT. ISAF 03-361
1419Z All 3 Casualties currently at Camp Keating, 2 Adults with severed ears, 1 with minor Shrapnal injury to right leg. all 3 are stable. All thee casualties are beibg evaluated by medical personnel. The 2 LN’s with missing ears are refussing higher medical care att
- June 17, 2007 Botched Raid
172100Z TF 373 OBJ Lane
NOTE: The following information (TF-373 and HIMARS) is Classified Secret / NOFORN. The knowledge that TF-373 conducted a HIMARS strike must be kept protected. All other information below is classified Secret / REL ISAF.
(S) Mission: O/O SOTF conducts kinetic strike followed with HAF raid to kill/capture ABU LAYTH AL LIBI on NAI 2.
(S)Target: Abu Layth Al Libi is a senior al-Qaida military commander, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) leader. He is based in Mir Ali, Pakistan and runs training camps throughout North Waziristan. Collection over the past week indicates a concentration of Arabs IVO objective area.
Result: 6 x EKIA; 7 x NC KIA, 7 x detainees
(S) Summary: HAF departed for Orgun-E to conduct link-up and posture to the objective immediately after pre-assault fires. On order, 5 rockets were launched and destroyed structures on the objective (NAI 2). The HAF quickly inserted the assault force into the HLZ. ISR reported multiple UIMs leaving the objective area. The assault force quickly conducted dismounted movement to the target area and established containment on the south side of the objective. During the initial assault, dedicated air assets engaged multiple MAMs squirting off the objective area. GFC assessed 3 x EKIA squirters north and 3 x EKIA squirters south of the compound were neutralized from air asset fires. The assault force quickly maneuvered with a SQD element on the remaining squirters. The squirter element detained 12 x MAMs and returned to the objective area. GFC passed initial assessment of 7 x NC KIA (children). During initial questioning, it was assessed that the children were not allowed out of the building, due to UIMs presence within the compound. The assault force was able to uncover 1 x NC child from the rubble. The MED TM immediately cleared debris form the mouth and performed CPR to revive the child for 20 minutes. Due to time restrictions, TF CDR launched QRF element to action a follow-on target (NAI 5). They quickly contained the objective and initiated the assault. The objective was secured and the assault force initially detained 6 x MAMs. The GFC recommended that 7 MAMs be detained for additional questioning. The TF CDR assessed that the assault force will continue SSE. The local governor was notified of the current situation and requests for assistance were made to cordon the AO with support from ANP and local coalition forces in search of HVI. A PRT is enroute to AO.
1) Target was an AQ Senior Leader
2) Patterns of life were conducted on — ——— from ——— ——— (strike time) with no indications of women or children on the objective
3) The Mosque was not targeted nor was it struck initial reports state there is no damage to the Mosque
4) An elder who was at the Mosque stated that the children were held against their will and were intentionally kept inside
UPDATE: 18 0850Z June 07
- Governor Khapalwak has had no success yet in reaching President Karzai (due to the Presidents busy schedule today) but expects to reach him within the hour (PoA reached later in the afternoon ~ 1400Z)
- The Governor conducted a Shura this morning, in attendance were locals from both the Yahya Yosof Khail & Khail Districts
- He pressed the Talking Points given to him and added a few of his own that followed in line with our current story
- The atmospherics of the local populous is that they are in shock, but understand it was caused ultimately by the presence of hoodlums
- the people think it is good that bad men were killed
- the people regret the loss of life among the children
- The Governor echoed the tragedy of children being killed, but stressed this couldve been prevented had the people exposed the presence of insurgents in the area
- The Governor promised another Shura in a few days and that the families would be compensated for their loss
- Tthe Governor was asked what the mood of the people was and he stated that “the operation was a good thing, and the people believe what we have told them”
- Additionally, the people accused the Yahya Khail Chief of Police and his officers of corruption and collusion with TB in the area
- The Governor and the Provincial NDS Chief relieved the CofP and his officers, disarmed them, and they are currently detained and enroute to Sharana at this time unknown as to total numbers detained (MTF on this incident)
- April 6, 2008 Outnumbered
(ENEMY ACTION) DIRECT FIRE RPT CJTF-82 : 0 INJ/DAM
At 0258Z, TF Bushmaster reported receiving small arms fire from an unknown number of AAF at 42S XE 248 042 IVO FOB Bella. (Conducting offensive operation Commando Wrath.) Elements in heavy contact on objective, with casualties, decided medevac on station as part of assault package. At 0337Z, TF Bushmaster requested an urgent and priority MEDEVAC for 2x US MIL WIA. 1x patient has gunshot wound to ankle and leg, 2x patient has gunshot wound to the arm. Total BDA at this time is 2x US MIL WIA and 1x LN Terp KIA. At 0348Z, TF Bushmaster requested additional CCA. At 0347Z, TF Bushmaster reported PID 2x insurgents moving toward OBJ Patriot, friendly forces engaged them and no further contact ATT, also a lot of VHF COMMS coming from the back side of the ridge to the west of Kendal. At 0356Z, TF Bushmaster reported an additional 2x US MIL WIA. At 0358Z, TF Bushmaster reported receiving small arms fire from high ground around their LOC. At 0417Z, TF Bushmaster reports effective sniper fire from a building roof north of their position at this time. At ———, PROFET 72 reports ARF inserted at ———, unable to pick up any casualties ATT. At ———, TF Bushmaster reported CDO is preparing to clear MOSQUE and adjoining buildings, the rest of OBJ Panther is securing at 0435Z. At ———, PROFET 72 reports ARF is engaged with INS, SAF and sniper fire from buildings, working CAS at this time. AT ———, Hawg-51 is rotating off station, Hawg,-53 coming on station at this time. At ———, TF Bushmaster reported possible grid for MEDEVAC as 42S XE 285 008. At 0503Z, TF Bushmaster reports they are pinned down by sniper fire north of their position. At ———, TF Bushmaster reports they are combat ineffective and request reinforcement at this time. At ———, TF Bushmaster reports they are going to break COMMS at this time and relay COMMS through ARF. At ———, TF Bushmaster reported MEDEVAC HLZ 42S XE 2850 0050; 6 x WIA located there; precedence and type unknown ATT; HLZ is not secure ATT. At 0513 TF Bushmaster reported that there are 50-100 insurgents moving to reinforce against Bushmaster elements from the SW. At ———, TF Bushmaster requested MEDEVACs for 4x US MIL WIA, and 2x ANA WIA. At ———, TF Bushmaster reported they have established a defensive position in a small building. At ———, TF Bushmaster reported HLZ is clear to receive MEDEVAC at this time. At ———, INTEL reports TF Busmaster has correct compound for Ghafour at this time and are continuing to clear at ———. At ———, TF Bushmaster reported consolidating forces at north end of Wadi, assessing number of casualties ATT and reporting insurgents on high ground all around their location, requesting CAS to engage insurgents location. At ———, TF Bushmaster reports that there are 9 total casualties; status of 3 new ones unknown ATT. At ———, Dustoff-34 reports recieving fire. At 0609Z, TF Bushmaster reports SSE continuing, found multiple weapons, mortars and small arms. At 0616Z, TF Bushmaster reported receiving fire from all around their position ATT, working to link up with GR 10 and 12 and move to initial HLZ at ———. At 0618Z, TF Bushmaster reports using CAS at this time to engage insurgents and need more suppression from CAS ATT. At ———, TF Bayonet MEDOPS reports tracking 6 WIA were picked up from HLZ/POI, and are enroute to JAF ATT. At ———, TF Bushmaster reported remaining CDOS at JAF are consolidating to PZ posture ATT. Prepping to L/U and reinforce, staging at PRT Kalagush. Number of available CDOs at JAF are 55x PAX now available. At ———, TF Bushmaster reports 6 casualties at their location, and requesting a MEDEVAC at this time. At ———, TF Bushmaster reported their consolidated location as 42S XE 2855 0070. At 0639Z, TF Bushmaster reported 1x US MIL WIA with gunshot wound to the pelvis and arm, 1x ANA with broken femur and assessing the 4x remaining ANA WIA. At ———, TF Bushmaster reported 8 detainees for Exfil. At ———, TF Bushmaster reported slash on 2 targets with GBUs. BDA 4x US MIL WIA, 5x ANA WIA, 1x ANA KIA, and 1x LN TERP KIA. ISAF Tracking # 04-149.
- March 8, 2008 Plea for Guns and Boots
Office Call between the Director General of National Directorate of Security and Commander of Regional Command-East
Amrullah Saleh Director General, National Directorate of Security
Major General David Rodriguez Commander, Regional Command-East, ISAF
Mr. Hasas Director of Intelligence, National Directorate of Security
Robert Maggi Foreign Policy Advisor, Regional Command-East, ISAF
—— ——— ————— Command Linguist, Regional Command-East, ISAF
Captain ————— ———— Recorder, Regional Command-East, ISAF
Sergeant ——— ———— CJ2 Analyst, Regional Command-East, ISAF
Security in Afghanistan
o The greatest concern for Director Saleh is security along the highways, particularly in Ghazni and Zabul, where he believes government officials cannot travel without security. He believes that the shift in Taliban focus from attacks on district centers to attacks along the highways is attracting recruits who are not actually Taliban but use the name to gain legitimacy, increasing the perception of the size, scope and strength of the insurgency and demonstrating GIRoA weakness.
o Saleh believes that there has been noticeable progress in Wardak, but it will be temporary unless it is extended to Ghazni and Zabul, as well as other areas.
o Director Saleh’s second major concern is for attacks in the major population centers of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Masar-e-Sharif.
o MG Rodriguez reported that there have been over 100 small drug labs destroyed in Nangarhar, primarily in Achin, with no complaint from the locals, and that the 101st brought an additional helicopter battalion that would assist with efforts there.
o Saleh reported that the #1 priority for the Afghan government is to fix the Ministry of Interior, indicating that the leadership was involved in considerable corruption. He remarked that it would be up to the US to fix it. He said he proposed to the British that they provide management classes.
o Director Saleh says that BG Razaq will serve well over Tagab and is a good commander. At the suggestion of putting an ANA force in Tagab, MG Rodriguez acknowledged the possibility of using the —————.
o Saleh acknowledged that the ———— Governor is active HiG, indicating concern.
o Saleh noted that ——— ————— ————— —— ———— were all previously HiG who have turned Taliban, are not reconcilable, and must be “taken out”. MG Rodriguez noted that there would be a meeting with the ———— NDS to determine how to approach this issue.
o Saleh believes that Hekmatyar is a reemerging figure being pushed to become more politically active, and expects he will be more influential in 2008 and 2009. Saleh believes that it is in the best interest of Afghanistan for Hekmatyar to remain in his current position, and that his capture or reconciliation would destabilize Afghanistan, based on his influence in Wardak and parts of Kapisa. They gave Hekmatyar’s last known address to ISI, but they did not action it and Saleh expects them to facilitate Hekmatyar’s move to another location.
o Saleh observed several actions by the Pakistan Military indicating their lack of will to commit to security operations in the FATA:
They have forces stationed at the port, where there is no immediate threat forces that could better serve along the border.
Following an ambush on a PAKMIL unit crossing the tunnel into North Waziristan about six weeks ago, the commander called Maulawi Ahmadjan to broker a peace with the insurgent force.
They lost control of Alizai last month and are not attempting to retake it because it is not in their interest, even though it is in their country.
They have asked the US to allow them time to clear each insurgent group, one by one, hoping that they will be allowed unlimited time in which the insurgents’ focus will turn away from Pakistan and toward Afghanistan.
They know where ————— ——— (travels to Miram Shah and Peshawar) and ——— ———— are, but will not go after them.
o Saleh assessed that Pakistan ISI and the Army will work to ensure that a weak Prime Minister is installed to preclude conflict with Musharraf. He described the wide-ranging control that the Army had throughout the government and industry, leaving little under the responsibility of the civilian government. He noted that there would be little change until a civilian government had real control.
Saleh predicts that General Kiyani will take a more active leading role as he realizes the breadth of his power.
o Saleh sees potential for the Quetta Shura to weaken and noted that the Miram Shah shura has turned toward criminality.
“Enemies of Afghanistan” flip-book
o MG Rodriguez provided the prototype “Enemies of Afghanistan” targets booklet to Director Saleh, describing that it would be provided to ANP and that it could be updated in the future. When asked if it should only include higher tier targets or all targets, Saleh said that it would be good to start with this version.
o Saleh reported that he has discussed the ———— ———— ————— ———— with GEN McNeill and MG Champoux and that ISAF is supposed work on it next week.
Logar NDS Chief
o MG Rodriguez reported that the new Logar NDS chief is working well with coalition and working to build trust with the ANA and ANP.
o Director Saleh reported that the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Justice had confirmed that ————— —————, who had been in US custody for 4 years and was reported to have been recently turned over to the ANDF, was not in Afghan custody, implying that he must still be in US custody. MG Rodriguez said we would figure it out.
o MG Rodriguez reported that ———— ————— would remain in US custody for further questioning. Saleh had little reaction and did not seem concerned.
o Director Saleh asked that ——— ——— be released to the NDS in Kabul, rather than in Nangarhar, and said that he would personally take responsibility.
Request for Support
o Director Saleh reported that the Afghan government has taken responsibility for the NDS budget, previously handled by the CIA, which would likely result in a 30% cut in the coming year. Saleh asked that, if possibly, RC-East provide AK, 9mm, and PKM ammunition; any other supplies, such as boots; and construction materials. He said that if this was possible, he would send officers from the NDS logistics office to facilitate.
- Dec. 9, 2008 Hammer vs. Fly
(EXPLOSIVE HAZARD) INTERDICTION RPT (Components) TF 2-2 : 1 UE KIA 1 UE WIA 7 UE DET
ISAF # 12-0374
At 1850Z, TF 2-2 using PREDATOR (UAV) PID insurgents emplacing IEDs at 41R PR 9243 0202, 2.7km NW of FOB Hutal, Kandahar. TF 2-2 using PREDATOR engaged with 1x Hellfire missile resulting in 1x INS KIA and 1x INS WIA. ISAF tracking #12-374
TF 2-2 DEPLOYED TO COMPOUND THAT THE WOUNDED INS FLED TO. FF HAVE CAPTURED THE INJ INS AND ARE CURRENTLY PURSUING OTHER INS THAT FLED THE COMPOUND.
UPDATE 100300D: TF 2-2 DETAINED A TOTAL OF 8X PAX TO INCLUDE THE 1X WOUNDED INS FROM EARLIER PREDATOR HELLFIRE STRIKE.
A SECOND QRF TEAM IS NOW EXPLOITING THE IMPACT SITE. 5X DETAINEES HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO FB HUTAL AND 3X HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO THE DC.
FF EXPLOITED THE IMPACT POINT AND FOUND 1X SHOVEL AND 1X PRYBAR. ALL FF ARE RTB.
BDA: 1X KILLED INS
1X WOUNDED INS
7X DETAINED LNs/POSS INS
EVENT CLOSED AT 0049Z
- Sept. 13, 2009 Lost Reaper Drone
(NON-COMBAT EVENT) EQUIPMENT FAILURE RPT ISAF HQ : 0 INJ/DAM
An F15 was ordered to shoot down a REAPER UAV that had lost its control link in the south of Afghanistan. All efforts were made to re-establish the link before a decision was made to shoot the UAV down prior it crossing into TAJIKISTAN. The CAOC selected an unpopulated area over which to down the aircraft. An F15 fired on the REAPER and it destroyed its engine, however the link was re-established and the controller was able to guide it into a mountain in RAGH District. The GRID of the downed REAPER is Lat ————— Long ————— // Keypad: ———. There were no sensitive items on board the REAPER but it did go down with its ordnance (Hellfire and GBU-12). NFTR.
***Event closed at 140210D*
- March 10, 2008 Investigating Police Extortion
031300z TF 3 Fury reports Illegal Taxing of jingle trucks investigation IVO Stogun checkpoint, Zurmat District
On 03 March 2008 at approximately 1300 hours, while working with —— —— —————, ANCOP ETT Team Chief, we received information from an Afghan truck driver that he had just been required to pay a bribe to a Zormat ANP patrolman at Stogan Check Point in Zormat District in order to pass through the check point. I had my interpretor take the driver’s statement and translate it into english, read the statement back to the driver and had him sign and thumb print the statement. —— ————— and I ask the driver if he would follow us back to Stogan Checkpoint and identify the patrolman he paid the bribe to and he agreed. We drove to Stogan Checkpoint where approximatley six trucks were lined up waiting to pass through the checkpoint. I had one of my interpretors ask each driver waiting in line to exit their vehicles and asked them if they had been required to pay any amount of money to pass through the checkpoint. All six drivers stated that they had been required to pay various amounts of money to pass through. —— ————— contacted MAJ Hussain, the ANCOP Chief of Police in Zormat, informed him of the situation and requested he come to Stogan Checkpoint.
While waiting for MAJ Hussain, I asked the seven patrolmen we detained to sit and relax while we sorted through a problem without ever mentioning why they were being detained. Three of the patrolman responded by saying that they had only taken money from the truck drivers to buy fuel for their generator.
When MAJ Hussain arrived, he was accompanied by CPT ————, Operations Officer for the Zormat AUP. MAJ Hussain took written statements from the seven truck drivers claiming they were required to pay a bribe to pass through the checkpoint as they identified the patrolmen that they had paid the bribe to and stated how much money each was required to pay. He then had his ANCOP search the person of each of the seven patrolmen being detained and found cash that was suspected to have been paid as a bribe on one or more of the patrolmen. MAJ Hussain collected the statements and cash, arrested the seven suspected patrolmen and returned to the Zormat Police District Center, and lodged the seven suspects in the detention cells. —— ————— and I contacted —— ——— ————— and —— ——— ————— to notify them of what had occurred.
—— ————— contacted —— ————— and I the next morning to notify us that special investigator from Paktia Provincial Headquarters were coming to Zormat to investigate. On 05 March 2008, after the ANCOP / Zormat AUP TOA had occurred and MAJ Hussain and the ANCOP had departed Zormat, the special investigators were preparing to go back to Gardez, —— ————— asked them what action they were going to take in the Stogan Checkpoint Police Corruption investigation. They stated that they could take no action due to having no evidence. At that time, —— ————— contact MAJ Hussain by phone and asked him what he had done with the truck driver witness statements. MAJ Hussain stated that he had turned the witness statements over to the Zormat AUP Detention Officer when he handed over custody of the suspected patrolment to him. When the Detention Officer was asked what he had done with the witness statements, he claimed he never received them.
- Dec. 4, 2009 Fighting Between Afghan Army and Police
(ENEMY ACTION) DIRECT FIRE RPT ANA / ANP : 4 HNSF WIA 1 CIV KIA 6 CIV WIA
A shooting incident occurred between ANA and ANP in TARIN KOWT CITY. TFU OPS is informing OCCP, OMLT and POLAD to mediate and conduct an investigation. More to follow.
As a result of the fire exchange, 1 x was killed (DOW – a family member of MAULLAHDAD, a KUCHI tribal leader), and a total of 6 x LN’s were wounded.
The wounded were evacuated and treated in both civillian and ISAF medical facitlites. First investigations by ANP reveal that ANA & ANP had an altercation over a car accident. The arguement esclated and ANA & ANP started to shoot at each other.
After the incident, the Deputy Governor of Uruzgan ordered MATIULLAH KHAN (Kandak Amniante Uruzgan militia) to re-establish order in TK. KAU elements subsequently took over all check points in TK, waiting for the ANP to relieve them in place.
Deputy Minister of Interior Mangal flew an investigation team led by ANP Brigadier General Mirawais to TK with RC(S) aviation assets. It is still not known if ANA will be part of the investigation board. RC(S) Comd or DCOM will join the investigation team in the afternoon.
BDA: 1 x ANA WIA, 3 x ANP WIA, 6 x LN WOUNDED, 1 x LN DOW
This Incident closed by RC (S) at: 050238D*DEC2009
- Sept. 3, 2009 Bloody Mistake
(FRIENDLY ACTION) CAS RPT (Bomb) KDZ JTAC, F-15S : 56 UE KIA
031542ZAUG09, OCC-P KDZ REPORTED 2X FUEL TRUCKS WERE STOLEN BY UNK NUMBER OF INS. INS INTENDED TO CROSS KDZ RIVER AT A FORD TO BRING THE FUEL TO CHAHAR DARREH DISTRICT. AT 1730Z, PRT KDZ JTAC OBSERVED KDZ RIVER AND REPORTED THAT IT DISCOVERED THE TRUCKS AS WELL AS UP TO 70X INS AT 42SVF8903852017, ON THE FORD ON THE RIVER. THE TRUCKS WERE STUCK IN THE MUD. COM PERT KDZ LINKED UP WITH JTAC AND, AFTER ENSURING THAT NO CIVILIANS WERE IN THE VICINITY, COM PRT KDZ AUTHORIZED AN AIRSTRIKE. AT 2119Z, AN F-15 DROPPED 2X GBU 38 BOMBS. AT 2158Z, BDA CONDUCTED BY F-15/ROVER WAS THAT 56X INS KIA (CONFIRMED) AND 14X INS FLEEING IN NE DIRECTION. THE 2X FUEL TRUCKS WERE ALSO DESTROYED.
041134D: 100X ANP WERE ON SCENE READY TO LINK UP WITH PRO COY AT PRT TO INVESTIGATE SCENE.
1213D: PRO COY STARTED TO MARCH TO AREA OF AIRSTRIKE AND ARRIVED ON SCENE AT 1234D. COY REPORTED THAT THEY HAD STARTED THEIR INVESTIGATION AND THAT THERE WERE A LOT OF ANA AND ANP AT THE AREA OF THE AIRSTRIKE.
1309D: PRO COY WAS ATTACKED WITH SAF FROM WESTERN DIRECTION. PRO COY RETURNED FIRE WITH SA. ENEMY FIRE STOPPED, SO COY CONTINUED WITH THEIR INVESTIGATION. AT 1322D, THE INVESTIGATION WAS COMPLETED. MEANWHILE, A LUNA (UAV) DISCOVERED SEVERAL PICKUPS AND PERSONS IN RAHMAT BAY (VF 879 523), SO PRT KDZ FIRED 2X 120MM ILLUMINATION MORTAR ROUNDS IN THEIR DIRECTION AT 1327D, TO PREVENT FURTHER ACTIVITIES OF POSSIBLE INS.
1353D: PRO COY MOVED BACK TO PRT KDZ AND ARRIVED AT 1423D.
At 0900 hrs International Media reported that US airstrike had killed 60 civilians in Kunduz. The media are reporting that Taliban did steal the trucks and had invited civilians in the area to take fuel.
ISAF HQ commenced CIVCAS procedures and conducted a brief over VTC with COMD RC-N.
Mitigation proceudres have commenced and liaison with GIRoA officials in KABUL and in KUNDUZ are a priority.
The Governor of KUNDUZ is commenting that most of the casualties were Taliban.
RC-N and PRT KDZ are gathering more facts.
041134D* ANP was with 100 policemen on scene and prepared to link up with PROTECTION COY (PRO COY), which will leave PRT for investigations ASAP. 041213D* PRO COY started march to area of air strike for investigation. 041218D* PRO COY arrived at HAJI SAKI DED BY (VF 903 526). 041234D* PRO COY was at (VF 888 522) reported about a lot of ANP and ANA at the area of the air strike. PRO COY starts with investigation. NFI.
041353D* PRO COY moves back to PRT KDZ.
041423D* PRO COY back at PRT KDZ.
NFI.56 Killed None(None) Insurgent
- March 5, 2007 Checkpoint Lessons
(FRIENDLY ACTION) ESCALATION OF FORCE RPT JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND : 1 CIV KIA
AT 050600ZMAR07 TF 2Fury reports that ANP shot a local national trying to drive through a check point. The ANP had a check point established on MSR Ohio, near the AB Band district center Vic of 42S VB 0066 5249. A car approached the check point at a high rate of speed. All ANP fled the check point except one. As the car passed the cp it knocked the lone ANP officer down, as the car passed the ANP fired at the vehicle, suspecting it to be a Suicide VIED. The driver of the vehicle was killed; the ANP was detained in Ghazni questioned and released shortly after. No IED was found and vehicle was destroyed. NFTR
Assessment ANP escalation of force was appropriate. Effects on the enemy demonstrate the ANP support of IO themes. Effects on populace clearly identify the importance of stopping at check points.
Future acts Continued training and assessment from Vigilent Archer
- March 21, 2007 Shooting a Deaf and Mute Civilian
210000Z TF Catamount reports Escalation of Force in AO(mod)
shooting of a Local National 21 March 2007
3. Delayed report from TF Catamount
S- 1 LN
A- Fled and failed to respond to escalation of force
L- Malekshay Village 42S WB 30529 08120
T- 21 Mar 07
R- Escalation of force, warning shots, wounding shot to leg.
LN was a deaf mute unable to hear the warnings or warning shots. Ran out of fear and confusion.
Information gained from SHURA to TF Catamount about Element operation
Details: OGA operating in TF Catamount sector moved into Malekshay for operation. LN ——— ——— ran at the sight of the approaching CF’s. CF utilized the escalation of force doctrine and shouted to stop, fired warning shots and then fired to wound. The LN was hit in the ankle and treated by Element medics on scene. It was determined through discussions with local Elders that the man was a deaf mute that was nervous of the CF operation. Solatia was made in the form of supplies and the Element mission progressed.
- Nov. 13, 2009 Escalation of Force
(FRIENDLY ACTION) ESCALATION OF FORCE RPT (HMG) JHFA UG55 : 0 INJ/DAM
JHFA UG55 reported that INS engaged with SAF onto FF IVO SZD. INTEL suggested they were going to be fired upon again during their extraction. UG55 fired 40x 30mm wanring shots to deter any furhter engagement from the INS.
BDA: No battle damage.
AH-64 (UG-55) fired 20 x 30mm warning shots into an open field at GR 41R PR 2305 0465. The terrain was considered rurally open and there were no CIV PID IVO the target within reasonable certainty. There was no damage to infrastructure. BDA redcording conducted by AH-64 Gun Tape. No follow up required. The next higher command was consulted. The enemy engaged presented, in the opinion of the ground forces, an imminent threat. Engagement is under ROE Card A. Higher HQ have been informed.
BDA: No battle damage.
This Incident closed by RC S at: 132311D*NOV2009
- Nov. 28, 2006 Orphanage Opens
Gardez Orphanage Ribbon Cutting
Theme of Ceremony: GoA and CF Support for Afghan Citizens
PRT Involvement? How? – The PRT provided transportation for the Governor from his office to the ceremony site
- In cooperation with the ANP, the PRT secured the event site. 3BSTB provided a QRF staged at the Gardez
airfield behind the event site
- The PRT Commander gave a speech about how honored we were to help the orphans and presented a leather jacket to the man who runs the orphanage. The jacket was donated by a friend of the commander in the United States with instructions to give it to someone special. The commander stated that she could think of no one more deserving then someone who cared for orphans
- In the Governor’s speech he thanked the PRT for their work on the orphanage and mentioned numerous other projects the PRT is working on. He also announced the funding of a school project in Ahmad Abad. After his speech, the governor presented 50K Afghani to the orphanage, enough for 500 Afghani per child. This money was his own personal money, not GoA funds.
- Other personnel making speeches were the Director of Social Services, a PC member and a respected elder from Ahmad Abad. All speeches were very positive
- Special recognition was given to the contractor who built the Orphanage, Engineer ————— ————, who was kidnapped by the Taliban in early Nov and released after 17 days of being held prisoner. Everyone expressed their thanks that he survived the ordeal and was able to attend the ceremony
- PRT CA provided blankets, scarves, coats, toys and HA food items to the orphans. They also handed out radios to the ANP who helped provide security
- Local media attended, as did a representative from AFN
- Dec. 20, 2006 Missing Orphans and Money
MTG – DEVELOPMENT
Meeting with Individual’s Name:————— ———— Individual’s Title:———— —————
- Discussed how the weather will likely affect our helicopter flight to Jaji and Chamkani scheduled for tomorrow morning. We anticipate at least a delay, if not cancellation. We will keep him advised. If it does not happen we discussed the possibility of a two day ground trip so he can stop at villages along the way and talk with people. We also discussed taking one day trips to other districts and he is very interested in this.
- The PRT CDR informed him that his concerns about not being informed, nor coordinated with concerning the operation in Jaji have been sent up the chain of command. He stated he is now willing to go to Jaji and talk to the people and ask them to cooperate with the searches for enemy personnel. He would like MGen Khaliq to be there as well.
- In addition, some leaders from Jaji met with —— today here in Gardez. They stated that there were tractors that have started leveling some land in the district and the villagers did not know why. The ————— asked us if this was one of our projects. We told him it was not a PRT project, but we would
check to see if other CF units may be doing something. Apparently the land is disputed and construction should stop until ownership is resolved.
- We showed him the list of large projects we are considering focusing on developing proposals for and/or lobbying for funds for over the next few months and asked his opinion. The projects were:
– Armored vehicle(s) for the governor
– Hydro-Electric Plant in Ahmad Abad
– Chormate mine in Zormat
– Security wall for the Gardez University
– Paving the Gardez-Chamkani-Patan-Pakistan road
– Road clearing/maintenance equipment
– Radio station in Zormat
– Robat school near Gardez
– Government motorpool
– He stated that he would also like us to look into finding a way to get the radio station in Chamkani to reach into Jaji
– He agreed with all the projects on the list, but felt that the mine would be very difficult and complicated and would take a lot to develop the infrastructure and processes to make it projective. He would prefer we concentrate on something which will benefit the people sooner. We told him our main goal of the mine project was to create long-term jobs. He said he would discuss the issue with the people of Zormat and other districts to see if they had some ideas for projects that could create a lot of this type of jobs.
– Discussed how it may be easier to get funding if we did the Gardez Pakistan road in phases, with the first phase being from Gardez to Sayed Karam. He said this was a critical road because the majority of the provinces population lived along it so most would benefit from the project. He also felt that its construction would give hope to the people because they would see the government and CF working for their benefit.
– When prompted, he said his priorities from the list would be first the university security wall, then the hydro-electric plant, then the paving of the at least the first phase of the road. He did not rank the others, but did mention that we should consider adding a clinic in Laji Mongal. He also stated that he would prefer we spend the money on helping the people instead of protecting ——— (note: he is being humble and showing his concern for ——— people over himself; however it is this attitude that makes us want to do whatever we can to help keep him alive).
- —— ———— stated that he has requested ——— ———— be replaced due to corruption and ineffectiveness. While we were there he received a list of potential replacements, but only their names were provided. He knows nothing about the men, so he wasnt sure how useful the list was going to be in regards to ——— recommending a replacement. He gave several examples of ineffectiveness:
– The suicide bomber who struck the ANA/ETT convoy on 15 Dec sat on the bridge for some time waiting for a target of opportunity. There is a police checkpoint on the Gardez side of the bridge, but they never checked out the vehicle
– The police search all the vehicles that come up to the checkpoint on the north side of town, but do not search vehicles at the other main entrances to the city even through there are supposed to be checkpoints there. At the one where they do search, they also charge a fee/bribe
– The ————— told ——— ———— to activate the checkpoints on all main roads leading into the city due to intel indicating that suicide bombers were heading for Gardez. This order was given on 14 Dec. The checkpoints were not manned and the attack happened the following day. Still, most of them are not active.
- He stated he would get a letter from the MoPW pledging support for fuel and operator salaries regarding the road clearing/maintenance equipment.
- He is currently working with TLO to initiate a project in Ahamd Abad involving agriculture. They hope this project will provide a lot of long-term jobs.
- We presented the HA pre-positioning plan for Paktya and explained where we were in stocking the supply points. He was pleased with this effort and suggested that once the ANA base was built in Jaji, this would be another good place to pre-position supplies.
- We told him that some people had come to our gate claiming to be returnees living in tents over by the prison and that they were in need of HA. He stated he had no knowledge of a returnee camp there and suspects that they were just looking for handouts. He stated there were only two returnee camps, Bonozai and Robat. We told him that we had a lot of clothing nd other items that have been donated by friends and family of service members back in the states. We would like to take these items and other DoD provided HA supplies out to a returnee camp after the Christmas Holiday. He said he would like to join us when we go and he would like to take the time to sit down and talk to them while we were there. We agreed this would be best.
- We expressed our concern that when we conducted a follow-up check of the orphanage that we opened a couple weeks ago, we found very few orphans living there and could not find most of the HA we had given them. He stated he was also concerned about what was going on over there and has no idea what they did with the money that he gave during the ribbon cutting which was supposed to be divided among the orphans. He does not believe they got any benefit from the funds. He also stated that he had only seen about 30 orphans, not the 102 that the orphanage director said lived there. He said he would have the Director of Social Affairs follow-up.
- —— ———— asked us if we had anything we could bring with us tomorrow to give to the people we meet with. We decided to bring some prayer rugs and Korans that we have on hand. He then … Remarks are continued in the comments section …
- Oct. 16, 2007 Orphans Gone
161620Z PRT GARDEZ DAILY SUMMARY REPORT
UNIT: PRT GARDEZ DTG: 16OCT20072000Z
LAST 24: SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES
POLITICAL: The Paktya Governor conducted a meeting with the PRT Commander, 3 Fury 5, and 3 Fury 3 at the Governors Office. He had concerns with the basic function of the Provincial Communications Center at CP Thunder. Currently that entity is not functional with little or no communications flow coming out of the center. The 3 Fury 5 stated that he will put major effort towards getting that center functional very shortly. The previously Gardez Mayor was fired due to cronyism according to the Governor as he had given people land near Banizia that were not entitled to it. ————— ———— ——— said that the Jani Khel and Dan Wa Patan Governors had both been replaced with new officials..
INFRASTRUCTURE: The PRT Logar Engineers met with officials from the Department of Public Works and the Puli Alam Municipality today to discuss work on the Logar Motor Pool. At the moment, the work at the site was placed on hold due to the Governor requesting a work modification and the need to created a water diversion system so the building will not flood. While all agree to this need, a bill payer has not been determined for the water diversion system, an situation that will need to be resolved at the PRT Commander and Governor level.
MILITARY: — —— ——— has arrived in Afghanistan and is currently at Bagram Air Field awaiting early morning transportation to Salerno, then onwards to Gardez later tomorrow afternoon to begin his PDSS trip.
SECURITY: There were reports of rocket fire in the general area of FOB Gardez, but the only reported damage was that a local Qalat was struck with minor damage, no injuries reported.) Gen Khaliq of the ANA Corps Commander is reported to be in Germany receiving medical attention for a heart problem.
SOCIAL: The PRT visited the Gardez Orphanage to conduct an assessment and drop HA and toys to the center. There are currently no orphans at the facility due to the Holiday (note: orphans are defined has having no father, but may still have mother and a family structure that will have them home for holidays.) Governor ———— states that the Red Crescent fund raiser (donation tickets) for winter relief has begun in the Province and will be collecting funds to aid the unfortunate during severe winter weather.
INFORMATION: The PRT and 3 Fury have discussed a IO Anti IED Reporting Plan with a IED Hotline put into effect. This will allow the AO to have a central reporting location that will allow for citizens to call the PCC or another agency with suspicious activity. Combined with 3 Fury, the PRT is planning a post Zormat security shura at the conclusion of major operations in that district.
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT:
CURRENT CLASS #s: Paktya: 0 Logar: 0
TOTAL TRAINED: Paktya: —— Logar: ——
REMAINING TO TRAIN: Paktya: — Logar: —
NEXT 96 HOURS: (WHY?)
M1 PRT Secures the Gardez Airfield in order to support the transportation of personnel and mail to and from BAF.
M2 PRT Engineer attends a conference with the Chief of USAF Engineers MG Eulberg in order to share information on PRT Engineer management.
M3 PDSS begins for —— ———, incoming PRT ———— —————, in order to facilitate information sharing for the incoming team.
M4 Engineers conduct a QA/QC of the Koshi Hydro Project in order ensure that the scope of work is abided by and there is quality work conducted.
M5 Civil Affairs travels to Ahmad Khel in order to conduct a AUP location check and secure signatures on the right of entry. Additionally conduct a Winter and athletics HA Drop.
M1 CAT A Team Logar travels to Sayed Karam in order to conduct assessments in preparation of the winter season, evaluate current school status and check on the AUP status.
M2- USAID meets with the Paktya Department of Transportation in order to deconflict the Gardez transportation master plan.
M3 USAID meets with LBG and 4/73rd in order to discuss the KG Pass master plan.
M4 CAT A Team drops HA at the Gardez Orphanage in order to support the unfortunate and destitude.
M5 PRT Medic evaluate the CP Lightning medical staff during a MASCAL exercise to assess the ANA medical staffs ability during a crisis.
M6 – PDSS continues for —— ———, incoming PRT ———— —————, in order to facilitate information sharing for the incoming team.
M1 The PRT Security Forces Platoon conducts soldier training for the PRT as a whole to ensure that they are current on tactical training and weapons shooting.
M2 PRT Commander calls in to the PRT Commanders Conference Call with FURY 6 to update current operations, projects, and concerns.
M3 PRT Drivers and TCs conduct weekly PMCS on all vehicles to ensure that they are fully mission capable.
M4 – PDSS continues for —— ———, incoming PRT ———— —————, in order to facilitate information sharing for the incoming team.
M1 The PRT Security Forces Platoon Leader meets with the ODA team at CP Lightning in order to discuss mutual training possibilities, especially use of the mounted weapons system range.
M2 The PRT Commander and the Governor travel to Liga Mangal in order to attend a shura to discuss issues and concerns in the newly formed district.
M3 CA/CE meet with the Logar Government Motorpool contractor and the Puli Alam Public Works Department in order to discuss location, water mitigation issues, and other concerns.
M4 Civil Affairs meets with the Kharwar School Contractor to discuss issues of completion of the building, to ensure a good quality product is turned over to the students of that district.
M5 – PDSS continues for —— ———, incoming PRT ———— —————, in order to facilitate information sharing
- Sept. 24, 2007 Democracy Blamed
240830Z Gardez PRT Paktya Provincial Council visit to Gardez PRT
The Paktya provincial council visited FOB Gardez and the following was discussed:
THREATS TO THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL (PC) MEMBERS
The provincial council stated the following related to several threats they have received: A month and a half ago a hand grenade was thrown in their compound downtown Gardez. One month ago a night letter was left in Jani Khel stating that the provincial council, parliament members, and the Chamkani senator should stop working and supporting the government. The letter was stamped with the Taliban mark.
They have received information that there are many ACMs in the Chamkani mountains. The Kushis see them frequently. The border of Chamkani and Jani Khel is a stronghold of the Taliban.
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL LACK OF RESOURCES/OPERATIONAL FUNDS
The provincial council does not have operational funds that allow them to move freely and do their work properly. They depend on vehicles on loan and gas that they pay out of pocket. This limits greatly their capability to promote the government of Afghanistan with the local people and find out about the peoples concerns.
CORRUPTION IN THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
The Chamkani Chief of Police and the Danwa Patan District Commissioner are fighting for the control (earnings) of illegal checkpoints.
The people of Afghanistan keep loosing their trust in the government because of the high amount of corrupted government officials. The general view of the Afghans is that the current government is worst than the Taliban.
Question to the PC members:
If the corruption in Afghanistan is so big, when did it all start and how far back in history?
Note: One PC member that was not actively participating decided to answer this question. This member appears to be the oldest in the group.
That is an excellent question. When the Russians were here the corruption did not exist. Later, when the Taliban took control of Afghanistan corruption did not exits. During none of the previous government in the whole history of Afghanistan this concept ever existed. The corrupted government officials are a new concept brought to Afghanistan by the AMERICANS.
This same PC member did the following question: Is this DEMOCRACY? or Is this the DEMOCRACY that the AMERICANS bring to Afghanistan?. This question was answered with a: NO, a corrupted government is not democracy.
The PC member continued explaining that previously in Afghanistan it was a shame to do something wrong like: theft, kill, and any other immoral act. Now everything depends on the amount of money you have. Years ago, if someone committed something immoral it was a shame to the whole family, now if you have money it does not matter. You can get to jail but it does not matter. You just have to pay the right people, the right amount and you will be out in a couple of days. With the Taliban if you did something wrong you pay for it, the money did not help you or exempt you from the right thing. This is what the people of Afghanistan see that the Americans brought to Afghanistan. This is the DEMOCRACY that they are living.
Question to the PC members:
Does corruption exist in Kabul?
Kabul is the root of the corruption. Is the most corrupted placed in Afghanistan but, because the government pays more attention to the capital the people live in a better condition. Kabul has corruption and development and the people live in better conditions than the other areas of the country. To give an example of how the corruption works from the higher levels to the lower levels: To obtain a provincial government position (District Commissioner, ANP Chief, etc.) the officials pay for that position. Then they work their way to re-coup the money they pay and make additional profit. There are no consequences of doing things wrong. These because of the DEMOCRACY and HUMAN RIGHTS. If people go to jail is it just a matter of paying to get out. Better than that, if you are corrupted they move you to other province/place/position. You did wrong in Paktya, lets move you to Khwost.
The peoples view of President Karzai if that he is a puppet of the Americans. So, if the Afghan government does things wrong the peoples blame the Americans. The people see that most of the government officials are repatriates coming from other countries and whenever things get bad they will leave. Some of these government officials came with no government experience at all and with the only interest of making their own profit/benefit in Afghanistan.
—— ———, CONCLUSION:
This is the general feeling of the common Afghan people or at least the common Pashtum. The majority of the Afghans are not wealthy people, if the people keep identifying DEMOCRACY as a system that is worst than the Taliban government. The people will support the Anti-Coalition forces and the security condition will degenerate. This is a current important issue that should be work from the higher levels of the coalition government/forces.
DO an Information Operation campaign explaining the Afghan people: What DEMOCRACY is? How a democratic systems works? What they can do to report wrong doing? (The last only if there will be real consequences to the wrong doing, if not the confidents/narrators will be squash by the system).
Create an organization that investigates public corruption. This could be work by either the Department of Justice or an Office of Inspector General.
Create a budget for the Provincial Council and give them the support needed to work against corruption. The PCs are the elected members that must be able to do direct contact with the people.
If someone is identified as corrupted take him completely out of the public service. Do not move him/move the problem to other location.
CA, Gardez PRT PPO